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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PiucE FIXING UNDER THE FAIR
TRADE Acs.-The plaintiff corporation, owner of the trade-marked "Philadelphia
Blended Whiskey", brought suit for an injunction against defendant corporation to
enjoin the sale by defendant of plaintiff's brand whiskey for less than the minimum
retail sales price established pursuant to the Florida Fair Trade Act. The defendant,
though not a party to one of these minimum resale price contracts, did knowingly
sell plaintiff's liquor for less than the price stipulated by plaintiff. The lower court
issued the injunction and plaintiff brought certiorari. Held, one justice dissenting,
that the statute was unconstitutional principally on the ground that it brought about
inequality of citizens before the law. Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.,
40 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1949).
Any activity which resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade was illegal at
common law.1 In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,2 the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of any statute, contracts with retailers to resell only at
stipulated prices were an unreasonable restraint of trade since such an arrangement
left no room for competition among the retailers by which the public might benefit.
Between 1933 and 1936 when predatory competition was ruining our economic
structure most of the states enacted Fair Trade statutes, essentially the same as the
one under scrutiny in this case,3 which provide that an owner of a trade-marked
product in free and open competition among products of the same general class
produced or distributed by others may enter into agreements with retailers establishing
a minimum resale price which that retailer must observe. 4 Not only the retailer but
any third person who acquires the trade-marked product is also bound by the resale
agreement, and anyone who shall willfully and knowingly advertise or sell such prod-
ucts at a price below the minimum agreed upon shall be liable to the manufacturer
for damages. 5 The professed purpose of these statutes was to protect the goodwill
of the manufacturers of trade-marked products and these agreements between the
manufacturer and the retailer of trade-marked products became known as vertical
price fixing. Agreements between co-manufacturers of products, whether trade-marked
or not, were called horizontal price fixing and were expressly excepted from the
privileges of the statutes. 6
In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,7 the United States
Supreme Court was called on to review the constitutionality of the Illinois Fair Trade
1. At common law, if the restraint of trade did not afford unreasonable protection
to the interests of one of the parties involved or did not constitute an unreasonable inter-
ference with the public welfare--to be decided upon the facts of each case--it was enforce-
able. Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351 (1880); Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9
Eq. 345 (1869).
2. 220 U. S. 373, 405 (1911).
3. FLA. STAT. § 541.01 to § 541.08 (Florida Fair Trade Law).
4. Vermont, Texas and Missouri do not have Fair Trade Acts.
5. Congress has added 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1941) (Miller-Tydings
amendment) to 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1941) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act)
in order to grant manufacturers of trade-marked products engaged in interstate commerce
similar contract rights.
6. This was because the evil was being caused by unfair practices on the part of re-
tailers.
7. 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
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Act, which is essentially the same as the Florida statute. The Court held that the
statute was constitutional After the Old Dearborn case judicial review of these
statutes was perfunctory. With the passing of time and the changing of economic
conditions, more and more trade-mark owners took advantage of these acts. In
December 1946 the Federal Trade Commission after examining the entire problem
of price fixing declared that the essence of retale price maintenance, viewed from
its effects upon the consumers market, was control of price competition because
"lack of adequate enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . [left] . . . a broad field
for the activities of organized trade groups to utilize these statutory privileges for
their own advantage and to the detriment of consumers.... "8
The Fair Trade statutes have been attacked unsuccessfully on numerous occasions
in both state and federal courtsP Out of this wealth of litigation a refined and
concatenated set of rules regarding the general topic of price fixing legislation has
been developed. In order to understand properly the position of the majority In
the instant case, the traditional point of view, referred to in the dissent,10 must be
considered.
The first point to be studied in this traditional view is the distinction the courts
have made between these Fair Trade Acts and those which provided for governmental
agencies, empowered to fix prices directly for a whole economic group, trade or
profession.1' The purpose of the Fair Trade Acts is to protect, from certain unfair
practices by retailers,12 the goodwill which is a validly acquired property right of the
trade-mark owner in his products and which belongs to him even after the product
is sold. The chief abuse by the retailers was the "loss leader" practice by which
they would advertise and sell a prominent trade-marked article at far below its market
value in order to attract consumers into their stores with the hope of making up for
this initial loss by extravagant profits gleaned from other items. That the "good
will" of the trademark owner could be lessened in the public eye because of such
practices is evident. The legislatures determined that the way to discourage this
abuse was to broaden the trade-mark owners' contractual rights by statute so that any
minimum resale price agreement he made with the retailers could be enforced against
them and all subsequent owners of the trade-marked products13 Since the Fair Trade
Acts were not specifically designed to set up a system of price fixing as an end in
itself, but were primarily designed to protect the rights of the trade-mark owners by
8. SumiAY AwD CoxcTusiov or THE FEDnR.L TRADE Coaussxo.m; LX1 (1946).
9. Mlax Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936); Pazen v. Silver
Rod Stores Inc., 130 N. J. Eq. 407, 22 A. 2d 237 (1941); Miles Laboratories , Inc. v. Seig-
nious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. S. C. 1939).
10. 40 So. 2d 374, 391 (1949).
11. A statute setting up a Milk Price Control Board would have for its primary end
the regulation of prices in this industry which is so closely allied to public welfare. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 193 (1936).
12. "And good-will is property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury to any
other species of property, is a proper subject for legislation. . . . The ownership of the
good-will ... remains unchanged, notwithstanding the commodity has been parted with."
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 194 (1936).
13. The retailer or subsequent owner could avoid the contract by removing the trade-
mark and selling the commodity as a commodity since the statute did not give the manu-
facturer any rights in the physical property he had sold but only allowed him to protect
the interest he had not sold-his goodwill. See note 12, supra.
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allowing them the means of fixing prices, they were held not to constitute an un-
lawful delegation of legislative authority, even though the legislature had no voice
in determining the ultimate price.14 Indirectly society as a whole would benefit by
the elimination of the vicious circle of predatory competition.
The second basic consideration in the traditional view is that these Fair Trade
Acts resulted in a permissible classification of citizens before the law in that they
extend rights to manufacturers of trade-marked products which they denied to manu-
facturers of non-trade-mark products, and in that they legalized vertical contracts in
restraint of trade and forbade horizontal contracts of a like nature. But it is never-
theless clear that, when considered in relation to their objects, such statutes did not
violate the state and federal constitutional guaranty of equality before the law.16
The courts have held that such inequality results only if classification either lacks a
rational relation to the professed objective or is a subterfuge to attain unjust advan-
tage for a particular group.16 If a court finds substantial arguments favoring the
legislature's position, the court should uphold the legislation since it is that body's
task to set the public policy regardless of what the court may think of the wisdom
of the legislation. 17 Thus, if the legislature has considered the presence of certain
14. Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 570, 2 N. E. 2d 929, 939 (1936), afJ'd,
299 U. S. 183 (1936), held: "The Fair Trade Act . . . does not even attempt to fix or
delegate to others the right to fix the price at which any commodity may be sold In the
market. . . . Only in event that manufacturers or distributors elect to avail themselves of
its provisions does the statute come into actual operation. This does not mean that the
act took effect upon the approval of any authority other than the legislative branch of our
state government. . . . When the Fair Trade Act was passed . . . it was a complete
statute, in no manner dependent for approval or disapproval by any person or group of
persons." In Revne v. Trade Commission of Utah, 192 P. 2d 563 (1948), a statute enacted
for the public health (not granting a special right to a class, see note 11 supra) gave the
Trade Commission a right of approval or disapproval of prices for the barbering pro-
fession if submitted by a representative group of barbers. The Commission was given no
authority to issue or enforce its own prices. The court held that since parties who ulti-
mately fixed the prices were the barbers themselves, the legislature left the terms of the
statute in the hands of a group not necessarily interested in the common good. This was
a delegation of legislative authority and therefore unconstitutional. In Matter of Levine
v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (1st Dep't 1949), the Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Law authorizing the State Liquor Authority, in its discretion, to prohibit sales
of any alcoholic beverages except pursuant to a Fair Trade contract, was also held un-
constitutional because it delegated to the State Liquor Authority the legislative function of
determining whether it wanted liquor prices fixed and by whom.
15. The FLA. CONST. DEcI.LARTioN or RIGHTS § 1: PEasoNAL RIoRTS: "All men are
equal before the law, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property. . . ." is
essentially the same as the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
16. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 423 (1935).
17. Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 336 I"1. 559, 564, 2 N. E. 2d 929, 933 (1936), aff'd,
299 U. S. 183 (1936): "To the extent that the Fair Trade Act effects a change in the
economic public policy of this state we have no power to interfere. It is wholly immaterial
whether the individual members of this court agree with the economic and social
philosophy upon which the Fair Trade Act is established, and no duty rests upon us to
pass upon the wisdom of the economic public policy which it declares."
[Vol. 18
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legally enforceable benefits to a specific class of citizens to be more consistent with
public policy than their absence, the courts should not remove those benefits by
judicial flat. In the case of the Fair Trade Acts sufficient reasons have been indicated
tending to justify the distinction between the rights of trade-mark and non-trade-mark
owners' s and the causal relationship between vertical contracts and the protection
of the trade-mark owner has been discerned. 19 Since this new contractual right is given
only to those trade-marked products which are in free and open competition with
products of other manufacturers, it seems that the public is protected from the
injustices of unreasonable restraints of trade. It is submitted that, on such basis,
the legislature's provision is not capricious.
Disputing this traditional view the Florida Supreme Court, in holding that the
Florida Fair Trade Act was unconstitutional, expressly rejected the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court and of many sister state courts,20 stating at the outset
of the opinion that: "We are in a more favored position as we have the benefit of
the actual consequences flowing from its application." 21 Throughout the opinion this
attitude of "let's look at the effects" prevailed. But the court did not seem to dis-
criminate between the effects which were contemplated by the proper enforcement
of the statute and those which resulted from its abuse.2 2 The court held that this
statute was, in effect, a price fixing statute and as such was an unwarranted and
unreasonable delegation of legislative authority allowing the will of a group of private
citizens to be enforced upon all citizens without permitting the latter to be heard
in the matter of setting the prices. This argument ignored the distinction made by
previous courts between statutes which were primarily price fixing and those which
were secondarily so, i.e., allowing price fixing as a means to a further end.P If the
types of price fixing are not distinguished it admittedly follows that the Fair Trade
Act puts the trademark owner in a powerful position. But if the statutory provision
of "free and open competition" in the particular field is enforced, the trade-mark
owner's alleged power over the public should shrink considerably. For he may price
himself out of the market. In this manner the public would always have some
control over the trade-mark owner. It was with this fact in mind that the courts
made the distinction between primary and secondary price fixing.24
The Florida court argued that unless there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between vertical and horizontal contracts both of which are, in their own vays,
restraints of trade, a sanction given to vertical contracts would be a violation of the
guaranty of equality before the law.m 25 Although the court recognized the interest of
the trade-mark owner in his product after sale and the power of the legislature to
protect that interest, it found that legislation which would sanction a restraint of
trade to accomplish this would be unreasonable since in today's economic situation
any restraint of trade would be inimical to the public welfare. The court admitted
that at the time of the enactment of the Fair Trade Act economic conditions war-
ranted such a restraint of trade. This argument of the majority of the court pre-
18. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
19. Ibid.
20. See notes 7 and 9 supra.
21. 40 So. 2d 374 (1949).
22. Id. at 375.
23. See note 11 supra.
24. See (dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes) Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Parks Co., 220
U. S. 373, 409 (1911).
25. See note 15 supra.
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supposes that the court has the right to test the constitutionality of a legislative
act by its conformity to the court's own economic theories or principles. This
assumption involved a usurpation of the legislative prerogative and tends to place all
such social or economic legislation in a state of insecurity. If the evidence which the
Federal Trade Commission has brought to light and the changed economic picture
require a review of the Fair Trade Acts, it is the proper function of the legislatures
and not the courts to handle the problem.28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROCTECTION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT-DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTION OF JURY.-The defendant, a Negro, was
convicted of assault in the second degree. Prior to conviction he had moved for
an order vacating the indictment returned by the Grand Jury of Nassau County,
alleging that the Grand Jury was unconstitutionally formed in that there had been
an intentional and systematic exclusion of Negroes. Evidence was adduced at
the hearing on the motion that no Negro had been called for service on the Grand
Jury in Nassau County for a period of ten to twenty years, although Negroes con-
stituted three percent of the total population and a number of them were qualified
for jury service. The Commissioner of Jurors of Nassau County testified that
there had been no intentional exclusion of Negroes from the Grand Jury lists and
that Negroes were constantly serving on petit juries in the county. The County
Judge denied defendant's motion and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed
that decision. Upon appeal, the following question was submitted to the Court of
Appeals: "Upon such testimony was a prima facie case established of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from the Grand Jury and if so was it rebutted and overcome
by the State?" Held, two judges dissenting, judgment of the Appellate Division
affirmed on the ground that no prima facie case of discrimination had been es-
tablished. People v. Dessaure, 299 N. Y. 126, 85 N. E. 2d 900 (1949).
"The American tradition of trial by jury considered in connection with either
criminal or civil proceedings necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from
a cross section of our country."' Although it is desirable that a jury reflect the
interests and viewpoints of all the races, classes and sects that inhabit a community,
it is not mandatory that every jury be composed of representatives from each of
these diverse groups, for no one can demand, as his right, a mixed jury.2 Neither
is proportional representation of any group on the jury a primary requisite.3 It
is necessary, however, that no person be intentionally or systematically excluded
because of his race,4 religious beliefs, economic status0 or sex.7 The Fourteenth
26. " ...bills for repeal of fair trade laws have been introduced in seven legislatures
during the last year .... " N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1949, p. 31, col. 2.
1. Thiel v. South Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946).
2. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
3. Adkins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945).
4. See In Re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291, 298 (1890).
5. Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. Rep. 297, 277 S. W. 1091, 1094 (1925).
6. Thiel v. South Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946). But cf. Fay v. New York 332
U. S. 261 (1947). Fay, who was convicted by a special or "blue ribbon" jury claimed
that certain occupational groups-laborers, craftsmen, operatives and service employees
were intentionally excluded from the special panel. The Supreme Court upheld the "blue
ribbon" jury and considered defendant's allegation as unproved, saying: "It is funda-
[Vol. 18
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Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees equal protection of the lav
to all citizens and the right to be tried by a jury formed without discrimination is within
this constitutional protection.6
The defendant making the allegation of discrimination in the selection of a jury
has the ultimate burden of proof on that issue.9 It is not sufficient to show simply
that members of a race have been excluded from the particular grand jury which
indicted the defendant.' ° The Supreme Court has consistently held that a prima
facie case of dscrimination or systematic exclusion is established upon showing that
for many years no members or disproportionately few of the members of a race
have been selected for jury service when they were available and eligible for such
service." How long a time this continuous exclusion of one race from jury service
must last, in order to create a basis for a prima fade case,' 2 has not been determined
with any degree of uniformity by the courts. In Neal v. Delawirel' Negroes num-
bered twenty-five thousand in a total population of one hundred and fifty thousand
and the exclusionary period was found to be approximately ten years. The court
held that the exclusion of Negroes from a jury under these circumstances was a
deprivation of a constitutional right and reversed the conviction. Negroes' ex-
clusion from the Grand Jury in Hill v. TexzaS 4 was established for sixteen years,
although fourteen per cent of the qualified population was colored, while in Pierre
mental in questioning the composition of a jury that a mere showing that a class was not
represented in a particular jury is not enough; there must be a dear showing that its
absence was caused by discrimination and in nearly all cases it has been shown to have
persisted over many years." Id. at 284.
7. In Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 (1946), it was said: "The systematic
and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, or an economic
or social class, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to
have in our democratic society." Id. at 195.
8. In interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303 (1879), stated, "Its aim was against discrimination because of race and
color. As we have said more than once, its design was to protect an emancipated race
and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those who belong to it . . .
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it designed to pro-
tect. It speaks in general terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its lan-
guage is prohibitory, but every prohibition implies the existence of rights and im-
munities, prominent among which is an immunity from inequality of legal protection,
either for life, liberty or property." Id. at 310.
9. Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Smith v. M'ssissippi, 162 U. S. 592 (1896).
10. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 320 (1906). The allegation of discrimination can-
not be established "by simply proving that no one of that race was on the grand jury
that returned the indictment or on the petit jury that tried the accused."
11. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939) ; Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938);
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
"It was, we think, under all the circumstances, a violent presumption which the state
court indulged, that such uniform exclusion of that race from juries, during a period
of many years, was solely because in the judgment of those officers, fairly exercised, the
black race in Delaware were utterly disqualified by want of intelligence, experience or
moral integrity, to sit on juriesY Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397 (1831).
12. Jefferson, Race Discrimination in Jury Service, 19 B. U. L. R-v. 413 (1939).
13. 103 U. S. 370 (1881).
14. 316 U. S. 400 (1942).
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v. Louisiana,15 where evidence showed that in 1930 Negroes constituted forty-nine
per cent of the total population, it was proven that no Negro had served on a jury
for forty years.
From an examination of the cases, it may also be seen that there is no criterion to
determine an improper disproportion. In Smith v. TexasaG the Negro population,
over half of which paid poll taxes composed twenty per cent of the county's total
population. The Supreme Court found discrimination, although five of the three
hundred and eighty four jurors who served between 1931 and 1938 were Negroes.
In Adkins v. Texas,17 however, the placing on the grand jury of one member of
the race, which represented fifteen and one half per cent of the total population of
the county, was deemed sufficient to meet the charge of deprivation of equal
protection. But in the majority of cases there has been a total exclusion of a
race for a number of years.' 8
A prima facie case, with the showing of a long continued exclusion of Negroes from
jury service, cannot be effectively rebutted by mere general statements of the jury
officials denying any racial discrimination in the selection of jurors or vowing an
obedience to their constitutional duty or explaining the absence of a race as due to a
mere failure to consider their qualifications for jury service. This question was decided
by the Supreme Court in Norris v. Alabama.10 The same view was repeated in Smith
v. Texas,20 and in Hill v. Texas.21 In the latter decision it was said that not only
should jury commissioners' professed lack of discriminatory intent be given little
weight but that "discrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who
exclude all negroes whom they do not know to be qualified and who neither know
nor seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified to serve. In such a case,
15. 306 U. S. 354 (1939).
16. 311 U. S. 128 (1940). In this case it was said that: "Chance and accident alone
could hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few negroes
from the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications
for jury service." Id. at 131.
17. 325 U. S. 398 (1945). "Fairness in selection has never been held to require pro-
portional representation of races upon a jury. . . . Our directions that indictments be
quashed when Negroes, although numerous in the community were excluded from grand
jury lists have been based on the theory that their continual exclusion indicated dis-
crimination and not on the theory that racial groups must be recognized." Id. at 403.
18. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613
(1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935);'Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226
(1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900).
19. 294 U. S. 587 (1935). "That showing as to the long-continued exclusion of negroes
from jury service, and as to the many negroes qualified for that service could not be met
by mere generalities. If, in the presence of such testimony as defendant adduced, the mere
general assertions by officials of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an
adequate justification for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision-adopted with special reference to their protection-would be
but a vain and illusory requirement." Id. at 598.
20. 311 U. S. 128 (1940). "But even if their [the commissioners'] testimony were
given the greatest possible effect . . . we would still feel compelled to reverse the decision
below. . . . If there has been discrimination whether accomplished ingeniously or in-
genuously, the conviction cannot stand." Id. at 132.
21. 316 U. S. 400 (1942).
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discrimination results necessarily where there are qualified negroes available for
jury service."22
The exact fact situation involved in the principal case presents a new question
to the courts of New York. It appears, however, to be concerned with a problem
essentially similar to the one which arose in Norris v. Alabama. 3 In that case, the
Negro population also formed a small percentage of the total population and it was
proven that no Negro had served on a jury in the memory of the oldest living person.
To rebut the defendant's case, one jury commissioner testified that jurors were
picked irrespective of race and color. The arguments set forth by the Alabama
state court,24 to uphold their decision of no discrimination, are similar to those
used by the majority of the New York Court of Appeals in the principal case. The
state court found that the jury commissioners had practiced discretion rather
than discrimination and their testimony, until proven false, conclusively established
that the Fourteenth Amendment had not been violated. When the case reached
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, found little
value in the reasoning of the state court and reversed its decision. The strong
prima fade case established by the defendant could not, it was said, be met by
"mere generalities".25 Discrimination was found on the strength of defendant's
proof of a continuous and systematic exclusion of his race from jury service, which
was not sufficiently explained by the state.
In the principal case, the Commissioner of Jurors testified that be had no idea of
the race or color of persons whom he recommended for grand jury service; that
the questionnaires required to be filled out by every prospective juror (stating
color, sex, height, weight and color of eyes and hair) were purely for identification
purposes.26 In short, he asserted that there was no intention on his part to dis-
criminate against Negroes in selecting the Grand Jury. The County Judge credited
this testimony and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals vas
thereby effectively prevented from reviewing the testimony of the Commissioner
since the Court of Appeals has no power to deny the right of the trier of the facts
to believe a credible witness.27 Constrained to accept this testimony, the majority
opinion concluded that no prima fade case of discrimination had been proved.
The controlling factor as conceived by the majority was the intent of the Com-
missioner, i.e., since the Commissioner did not intend to discriminate, no systematic
exclusion of Negroes from the Nassau County Grand Jury had been established,
Although the professed lack of discriminatory intent of the Commissioner nega-
tived the defendant's charge of intentional exclusion, it did not even reach the charge
of systematic exclusion. The majority opinion apparently ignored the ten to twenty
year exclusionary period of Negroes from the Grand Jury in Nassau County. Or
perhaps, the necessary inference of exclusion to be drawn from the long-continued
absence of Negroes was not sufficient to establish a prima fade case.
The minority opinions rejected the statements of the Commissioner of Jurors
22. Id. at 404.
23. 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
24. 229 Ala. 226, 156 So. 556 (1934).
25. 294 U. S. 587, 598 (1935).
26. See People v. Dessaure, 299 N. Y. 126, 131, 85 N. E. 2d 900, 901 (1949). See Schechter
and Affron, Selecting Persons for Jury Service in New York. State, 26 Co.'mr.r. L. Q. 667
(1941).
27. People v. Scheinman, 295 N. Y. 142, 65 N. E. 2d 750 (1946); N. Y. Co:.sr. Ani. VI,
§ 7; N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 605.
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as to his intention, though conceding their truthfulness, and chose to apply the
long-standing test imposed by the Supreme Court. Judge Fuld28 upheld the propo-
sition that similar testimony has been "uniformally rejected on the ground that
general protestations, bland professions, as to lack of deliberate design are in-
sufficient in the face of figures establishing the total absence of Negroes from the
jury lists."'29 Whether there was an active elimination on the ground of color or
whether there was a passive reaction on the part of the commissioners in failing to
take affirmative measures to insure that the jury be democratically and represen-
tatively chosen, should make little difference since an attitude of indifference and
complacency has been deemed sufficient to point to unconstitutional exclusion when
there has been such a long-continued absence and there are Negroes qualified for
jury service. The reasoning of the prevailing opinion is also attacked by Judge
Desmond,3 0 who pointed out that the question is not the narrow one of whether the
Grand Jury of Nassau County was deliberately chosen by discriminating means.
If such were the case, Judge Desmond conceded that he would agree with the
opinion of the majority of the court since nothing of the sort was proven. However,
here it was plain from the record that for several years all Negroes had been absent
from Grand Juries and were absent from the Grand Jury which indicted appellant
and that a system had been followed in Nassau County which had resulted in the
exclusion of an identifiable group who were qualified for jury service. He concluded,
therefore, that the court should have vacated the indictment.
It is submitted that the "actual intent" test' applied in the prevailing opinion ap-
pears to be setting up a new criterion for proving discrimination in the selection
of a jury in New York. It is true that appellant's brief alleged both an intentional
and also a systematic exclusion on the part of the Commissioner of Jurors. The
prevailing opinion satisfactorily rebutted the claim of any "intentional" discrimi-
nation by the testimony of the Commissioner of Jurors as to his lack of dis-
criminatory intent. But it failed to consider the more basic proposition of systematic
exclusion, intended or unintended. Consequently, it failed to appreciate the signifi-
cance of a long continued, unexplained exclusion of Negroes from Grand Jury lists
which existed in Nassau County. Therefore, it failed to deduce that a faulty course
of conduct, whether deliberate or not, was to be inferred from this exclusion, which
would have to be rebutted, according to the Supreme Court, by more than mere
statements that there was no intention to discriminate. In order to rebut a prima
facie case of discrimination by exclusion the prosecution would have to introduce
evidence to the effect either that Negroes had been called for Grand Jury service
but were not found to possess the necessary qualifications or that they had offered
excuses to secure exemption. It is interesting to find that two Negroes were selected
and placed on the Grand Jury list but a short time after the court below denied
defendant's motion to set aside the indictment.31
The mathematical discussion which the prevailing opinion in the principal case
evolved as a background to the decided issues can have very little legal effect.
It is applied merely to the year 1946 and the appellant's contention that the ex-
clusion of Negroes had existed for the past decade or so is apparently ignored. The
Supreme Court has condemned the practice of considering only one particular jury
28. Id. at 134, 85 N. E. 2d at 903.
29. Id. at 135, 85 N. E. 2d at 904.
30. Id. at 132, 85 N. E. 2d at 902.
31. Id. at 134, 85 N. E. 2d at 903.
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list32 and also the use of figures and percentages to find an absence of unconstitutional
exclusion.33
It is submitted that the prevailing opinion in the principal case is treading on
dangerous ground in setting up a new standard of determination in such cases.
The dissents' contention that a prima fade case was established by a long-con-
tinued exclusion and that the testimony of the Commissioner of Jurors as to his
intent, should be rejected in the face of such evidence, commends itself as the
proper approach. The majority opinion finds little support in precedent and is
contrary to the spirit of the Constitutional guaranties of civil rights to all citizens.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-SCOPE OF REVIEW O THE SUPRE .E
CouRT.-Petitioner delivered a speech in a crowded auditorium, at a meeting that
was picketed by an angry mob of approximately one thousand people. Despite
police protection, disorders broke out and arrests were made. Knowing of this
atmosphere of tension and violence, petitioner delivered a long semi-facist, anti-
Semitic speech in which he addressed the crowd outside and certain members of
the minority of his audience as "slimy scum" and other opprobrious names. The
speech stirred the audience to immediate expressions of anger and unrest. Petitioner
was arrested, and after a jury trial, was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation
of a Chicago city ordinance and fined. Upon appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the
Illinois Appellate Court, and, upon further appeal, by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Petitioner brought certiorari. Held, four Justices dissenting, judgment of conviction
reversed on the ground that the trial court's instructions to the jury that breach
of the peace included speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance, . . ." invaded the right of free
speech guaranteed under the First Amendment, and that a general verdict of guilty
under the ordinance so construed could not stand. Tcrnidillo v. City of Chicago,
337 U. S. 1, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934 (1949).
32. In Patton v. Missisippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947), the Supreme Court in finding
discrimination said: "In this case the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that peti-
tioner had failed to prove systematic racial discrimination in the selection of jurors, but
in so concluding it erroneously considered only the fact that no Negroes were on the
particular venire lists from which the juries were drawn that indicted and convicted
petitioner. It regarded as irrelevant the key fact that for thirty years or more no Negro
had served on the grand or petit juries." Id. at 466.
33. Id. at 467. The argument of the State Court is set out in the Supreme Court's
opinion: "Of the 25 qualified negro male electors--there would be left, therefore, as
those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male negro electors as compared with ,50 to 6,000
male white electors as to whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a pro-
portion of 5,000 nonexempt white jurors to 12 or 13 nonexempt negro jurors or about
one fourth of one per cent negro jurors---400 to 1 ... there was only a chance of 1 in
400 that a negro would appear on such a venire and as this venire was of one hundred
jurors, the sheriff had he brought in a negro, would have had to discriminate against
white jurors, not against negroes-he could not be expected to bring in one-fourth of
one negro." Concerning this, the United States Supreme Court said (at 468): "The above
statement of the Mississippi Supreme Court illustrates the un sdom of attempting to
disprove systematic racial discrimination in the selection of jurors by percentage cal-
culations applied to the composition of a single venire."
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To contest the constitutionality of a state statute before the Supreme Court, a
party must have exhausted his remedies in the state courts.' It must be shown
that there was a final judgment in the highest state court wherein the constitutionality
of the statute was made an issue. 2 There must also be compliance with the Rules
of the Supreme Court, which provide in part: "Only the questions specifically
brought forward by the petition for the writ of certiorari will be considered." a
Unless the statute is challenged as unconstitutional in the petition to the Supreme
Court, therefore, that Court does not have the jurisdiction to question its un-
constitutionality. It is not enough that "there may be somewhere hidden in the
record a question which, if it had been raised, would have been of a federal nature.
' 4
The question presented to and argued before the Supreme Court in the principal
case was whether petitioner's speech "was composed of derisive, fighting words
which carried it outside the scope of constitutional guaranties."r, The Court re-
versed the conviction, however, because the ordinance was unconstitutional. The
unconstitutionality of the ordinance was based upon an interpretation of the ordi-
nance derived solely from an isolated sentence found in the trial court's charge to
the jury. The Court thereby ignored the question properly before it, and decided
the case by rather unprecedented reasoning on a question, it is submitted, that
was not even open to review by it. The question actually decided was not open to
review because the validity of the instructions to the jury was not made the basis
of the petition for certiorari, was not included in the "questions presented", and
was not included in the "reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ."0 More-
over, as the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter asserted, the objection
relied on by the majority of the Court was explicitly disavowed before the Court by
counsel for the petitioner. 7 The opinions of the state courts show that the in-
struction to the jury was not discussed by the Illinois courts,8 and apparently was
no part of the case on appeal, as Chief Justice Vinson in his dissent said "until
this Court's independent research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat con-
fused record."9
The majority of the Court considered Stromberg v. California'0 as precedent for
its holding in the principal case." Reliance upQn that case would appear to be
1. 23 U. S..C. § 1257 (Supp. 1948). See also Gorman v. Washington University, 316
U. S. 98 (1942).
2. Newman v. Gates, 204 U. S. 89 (1907).
3. RuLEs oF THE SuPREmE CouRT, Rule 38, par. 2. For application of the rule, see
Flornoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 259 (1944). "It is a familiar rule, consistently followed,
that upon appeal from a state court this Court will not pass upon or consider federal
questions not assigned as error or designated in the points to be relied upon even though
properly presented to and passed upon by the state court. . . . The rule is the same in
cases of applications for certiorari."
4. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 362 (1927).
5. 337 U. S. 1, 3 (1949).
6. Id. at 9.
7. Ibid.
8. City of Chicago v. Terminielo, 332 fI1. App. 17, 74 N. E. 2d 45 (1947); 400 Ill. 23,
79 N. E. 2d 39 (1948).
9. 337 U. S. 1, 9 (1949).
10. 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
11. 337 U. S. 1, 5 (1949).
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misplaced. In the Stromberg case, the appellant had been convicted under a general
verdict for violation of a section of the California Penal Code penalizing the public
display of a red flag (a) as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organ-
ized government, or (b) as an invitation or stimulus to an archisic action,
or (c) as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.' The information
alleged a violation of each of the three activities condemned by the statute, though
the trial judge in instructing the jury followed the express terms of the statute
and charged that the appellant should be convicted if the flag had been raised for
any one of the three purposes. The appellant accepted the instructions at the trial,
but on appeal in the state court and before the Supreme Court, maintained that
the first clause of the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the first
section was unconstitutional, and, since the conviction had been obtained under
a general verdict, that it could not be assumed that the conviction had not been ob-
tained under the unconstitutional section.13 The Court held that "a statute ,hich upon
its face, and authoritatively construed is so vague and indefinite as to permit the
punishment of the fair use of this opportunity, is repugnant to the guaranty of
liberty, contained in the Fourteenth AmendmenL' 14
It is submitted that the Stromberg case and the principal case are readily dis-
tinguishable in several important features. In the Stromberg case, the ground on
which the Supreme Court reversed had been maintained on each appeal; in the
principal case, the ground on which the Supreme Court reversed was never urged
and, in fact, was disavowed by the petitioner. 15  In the Stromberg case the in-
structions to the jury were in the precise laiguage of the statute; 10 in the principal
case the instructions were in the trial judge's own language which attempted to
define the type of conduct that would constitute a violation of the statute.'7 Further-
more, while it is true that in the Stromberg case the appellant did not object to
the instructions of the trial court, it is essential to understand that the Supreme
Court in that case did not arrive at its decision solely on the basis of those in-
structions, as the majority in the principal case indicated. s The Court in the
Stromberg case relied upon the fact that the appellant accepted the instructions,
only to interpret what it believed appellant's contention to be, namely, that since
the instructions had been accepted, appellant was attacking the validity of each of
the three disjunctive clauses of the statute itself.") Beyond this, the instructions
themselves did not enter into the case. It was the statute itself and not the instruc-
tions to the jury that was attacked. It is submitted that by reviewing the instruc-
12. CAL. Pz-w. CoDz § 403-a.
13. 283 U. S. 359, 367 (1931).
14. Id. at 369.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. 283 U. S. 359, 363 (1931).
17. 337 U. S. 1, 3 (1949).
18. 337 U. S. 1, 5 (1949).
19. The exact words of the Court are quite dear upon this point. '"s the trial court
had treated the three purposes of the statute disjunctively, and the appellant had ac-
cepted that construction, we think that the only fair interpretation of her contention is
that it related to the validity, not merely of the statute taken as a whole, but of each one
of the three clauses separately relied upon by the State in order to obtain a conviction.
Her concession as to the interpretation of the statute emphasizes, rather than destroys,
that contention." 283 U. S. 359, 364 (1931).
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tions to the jury as a basis for reversal on its own initiative, the Court in the
principal case has apparently taken the position that the state supreme court by
affirming the conviction, had adopted and approved of the trial court's instructions
to the jury, despite the fact that the state court was precluded from reviewing the
instructions. 20 This action by the Court misconstrued the holding of the Stromberg
case and ignored a long line of cases including Dewey v. Des Moines2 1 and Whitney
v. California.22
Assuming, without conceding, that the majority was within its legitimate power
in reviewing the instructions to the jury, it is submitted that the instructions, when
considered in the context of the concrete situation and evidence before the trial
court did not infringe petitioner's constitutional rights and guaranties. The free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is not an absolute right or
license to speak or publish anything one may wish with complete immunity from any
punishment.23 Rather, "... the language of this amendment imports no more than that
every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any sub-
ject whatsoever without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure any
other person in his rights, person, property or reputation; and so always that he does
not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government." 2 4 Just
as the First Amendment protects the right of free speech from abridgement by
Congress, so the Fourteenth Amendment protects it from invasion by state action.25
In attempting to establish a means of determining when this freedom has been
invaded, Justice Holmes over thirty years ago proposed the famous "clear and
present danger" test.26 This test, which has been applied and reiterated with but
few exceptions ever since,27 posits the question "whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
20. 400 Ill. 23, 29, 79 N. E. 2d 39, 43 (1948). "It must be observed at the outset
that the jury found the facts against defendant, the trial judge refused to set aside the
verdict and the Appellate Court reviewed the evidence in detail and affirmed the judg-
ment. Under these circumstances, this being a civil case, we are precluded from examining
the record except to support the verdict and whether the trial court and the Appellate
Court properly applied the law to the facts." See also, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110 § 216 (1945).
Further, it is important to notice that this was a civil case in Illinois. "An action in-
stituted for the recovery of a penalty provided for by a municipal ordinance, prohibiting
use of profane and obscene language is a civil action, though the person charged with
such breach may be brought into court under a warrant, and therefore either party has
the right of appeal." Knowles v. Wayne City, 31 Ill. App. 471 (1889).
21. 173 U. S. 193, 200 (1899). "A point that was never raised cannot be said to have
been decided adversely to a party, who never set it up or in any way ever alluded to it.
Nor can it be said that the necessary effect in law of a judgment, which is silent upon
the question, is the denial of a claim or right which might have been involved therein
but which in fact was never in any way set up or spoken of."
22. 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
23. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).
24. 2 STORY, CONSTTUnON § 1880 (5th ed. 1891).
25. Although this was expressed as dictum in the Gitlow case, note 23 supra, the
Supreme Court so held for the first time in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
26. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
27. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 671 (1925).
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to prevent." 28 The "dear and present danger" doctrine thereby takes an utterance
in a context of violence out of the constitutional guaranties. - 3 Thus in Cantwell
v. Con ecticut,3 o the Supreme Court defined breach of the peace as including "not
only violence, but acts and words likely to produce violence in others."3 ' A later
opinion by a unanimous Court held that the right to punish the use of "... . the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace .. .".3 has never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem. It is submitted that the term "slimy scum" and other opprobrious epithets
used by the petitioner in the circumstances in which they were uttered was dearly
the type of "fighting" words referred to above and that they are not within the
protection of free speech.
In the light of the "clear and present danger" test and the subsequent decisions
based upon that test, there would seem to be little room for upholding petitioner
on the only point argued before the Court. By its actions in the principal case,
the Court has extended the scope of its review without regard to precedents, rules,
or the relationship of the Supreme Court to the highest courts of the states. If
this procedure is followed by the Court in the future, the entire system of appeals
to the Supreme Court might be definitely altered. However, the Court's ruling in
the principal case was intended, apparently, to decide the single issue of this one
case relating to freedom of speech and can probably be considered as having no
extensive legal significance.33 Even upon such consideration, the majority opinion
is open to attack as an unwarranted and needless extension of the right of free
speech.
CORPoRATIONS-VOLUNTARY DISSOLuTIo,,-RQuIP, E1,ENT THAT DIssoLUrTIoN BE
BENrFIcIL To STocx.o-EsR.-Two stockholders, each a director owning one-half
of the stock of the X Corporation, were in disagreement and were unable to select
a third director. Proceedings for dissolution were brought by one of the stockholders
under the provisions of Sections 103 and 117 of the General Corporation Law which
permit the holders of one-half of the corporate stock entitled to vote at an election of
directors to petition for dissolution of the corporation if the votes of the stockholders
are so equally divided that they cannot elect a board of directors, and further provide
that an order dissolving the corporation must be made if the dissolution will be bene-
ficial to the stockholders and not contrary to the public interest. A referee's report di-
rected dissolution. On appeal, held, one justice dissenting, reversed on the ground that
28. Ibid.
29. In stressing the fact that behind the guaranty of free speech lay faith in an appeal
to reason, Justice Frankfurter said, "But utterance in a context of violence can lose its
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such
utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. ' Milk Wagon Drivers Union
v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 293 (1941).
30. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
31. Id. at 303.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942).
33. See generally, Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment:
A Resume, 30 YALE L. J. 48 (1920), and Goodrich, Does The Constitution Protect Free
Speech?, 19 AcH. L. REv. 487 (1921).
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the requirement that dissolution be beneficial to stockholders was not satisfied.
Matter of Cantelino, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949).
The conditions contemplated by Section 103 of the General Corporation Law1
were concededly present in the principal case and there was also compliance with
the requirement of Section 1172 that the dissolution be not injurious to the public.
The only controversy in the case centered on whether the dissolution was beneficial
to stockholders, the remaining requisite of Section 117.
The majority opinion in the instant case maintained that the object sought by the
petitioner in applying for the dissolution was a purely personal one and was not in any
sense beneficial to stockholders since the dissolution was sought by the petitioner as
a means to gain control of the business. The court refused to lend its aid in furtherance
of such a scheme. The dissent pointed out that the provisions of the order of dis-
solution for the sale of corporate assets adequately protects appellant against this
contingency since he would have an equal opportunity to purchase the assets and
thus prevent the respondent from gaining control. The dissenting opinion further
stated that "the situation of a close corporation with two fifty per cent stockholders
in irreconciliable dissension and engaged in constant legal warfare under circum-
stances where corporate success and efficiency imperatively demand cooperation, is
one calling for the relief provided by the statute"3 and distinguished the case of
Matter of Myer, et al.4 upon which the court had predicated part of its argument.
The cases involving the sections of the General Corporation Law referred to above
are, for the most part, lower court cases which at best can only serve as indicia of the
line of reasoning which the Court of Appeals will follow in the event that the ques-
tion is squarely presented to it. The application of the statutory provisions to cor-
porations having numerous stockholders actually involves little difficulty. When
the other statutory requirements are present, the court will merely consider the
interests of both the majority and minority stockholders5 and, in the exercise of its
discretion,6 determine whether or not dissolution will result in benefit to the stock-
1. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 103: "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation, . . . if the votes of its stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect a
board of directors, the holders of one-half of the stock entitled to vote at an election of
directors may present a verified petition for dissolution of the corporation as prescribed
in this article."
2. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 117: "If upon the application for the final order, It shall
appear that the case is one specified in this article and that a dissolution will be beneficial
to the stockholders or members and not injurious to the public, the court must make a
final order dissolving the corporation, and if the corporation is insolvent appointing one
or more receivers of its property."
3. 275 App. Div. 231, 233, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1st Dep't 1949).
4. 272 App. Div. 888, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (1st Dep't 1947), leave to appeal denied, 297
N.Y. 1038 (1947). Petitioners were the holders of bare legal title to half of the stock;
the beneficial owner was their father, an incompetent. Dissolution was opposed by the
committee for the incompetent. There was no deadlock over policy among the holdover
board of directors. Petitioners had no connection with the operation of the business, nor
had they ever been members of the board of directors.
5. Matter of Rateau Sales Co., 201 N.Y. 420, 94 N.E. 869 (1911) ; In re Cowles Realty
Co., 193 App. Div. 874, 184 N.Y. Supp. 778 (Ist Dep't 1920).
6. In In re American Telegraph & Cable Co., 139 Misc. 625, 627, 248 N.Y. Supp. 98, 100
(Sup. Ct. 1931), the court said: " . . . on the ultimate issue as to whether dissolution Is
for the best interest of the stockholders, the court must exercise its discretion."
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holders, a concept which in the final analysis means either direct pecuniary benefit,
or indirect pecuniary benefit such as that derived, for example, from the performance
of some corporate duty or function.7 This discussion will, therefore, be confined
to the more difficult situation where, as in the principal case, the corporations' stock
is held equally by two owners.
Our courts have in a few cases recognized that "two-man" corporations are
"little more than chartered partnerships" 8' which should be treated accordingly. This
seems to be both a sound and a practical approach. It is well settled that equity
will grant dissolution of a partnership where irreconcilable dissension exists between
the partners.9 As in the analogous corporation cases, mere trifling disagreements
will not suffice.10 It is not clear in the principal case whether the petitioner actually
caused the existing dissension; if he had, then the analogous partnership law would
deny dissolution." However, if both parties were responsible for the lack of harmony,
an application of partnership principles would have produced a contrary result.
Nevertheless, considering the case solely from the viewpoint of the New York statu-
tory law of corporations, the requirement that dissolution must benefit the stock-
holders cannot be ignored.' 2
The court based its failure to find benefit to stockholders solely upon the fact
that, in seeking dissolution, petitioner was striving to further his personal interest
by gaining control of the corporate assets and that such a reprehensible motive and
benefit to all of the stockholders cannot co-exist in dissolution. Such an interpreta-
7. Hitch v. Hawley, 132 N.Y. 212, 30 N.E. 401 (1892).
8. Ripin v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912).
9. "It is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner that a court of
equity, at the instance of another, will dissolve the partnership and close up the affairs of
the company. The court will require a strong case to be made .... " See Whalen v. Stephens,
193 111. 121, 61 N.E. 921 (1901); Cash v. Earnshaw, 66 IM. 402, 403 (1872) (dkolution
denied because dissension not serious); Bishop v. Breckles, 1 Hoffm. Ch. 534 (N.Y. 1840).
10. "It seems to be well settiled that, if quarrels and disagreements betveen partners are
relied upon to dissolve partnerships, they must be of such a serious and permanent character
as to prevent the profitable continuance of the partnership business. Trifling and minor
grievances .. .will not be sufficient." Allen v. Vanderford, 84 Okla. 127, 129, 202 Pac.
786, 787 (1921); See also Cash v. Earnshaw, 66 Ill. 402 (1872).
11. Gerard v. Gateau, 84 Ill. 121, 125 (1876): "A party who is the author of the ill
feeling between himself and partners ought not to be permitted to make the relation he
has induced the ground of a dissolution of the partnership. His conduct may have been
taken with a view to that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow him advantage
from his own wrongful acts. It would allow one partner, at his election, to put an end to
his own deliberate contract, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful act or omission
of duty. The results flowing from the premature dissolution of a partnership might be
the most disastrous to a partner who had embarked his capital in the enterprise."
12. "A final order dissolving the corporation does not and will not under the amendment,
inexorably follow upon the filing of the petition. It must appear to the court that disso-
lution will be beneficial to the stockholders or members and not injurious to the public....
The rights of all the stockholders must be considered." 10 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6S-k (1944).
"But conceding that the stock of the corporation is equally divided into not more than
two independent ownerships or interests, it must be further shown that it would be beneficial
to the interest of the stockholders that the corporation should be dissolved." In re George
Ringler & Co., 70 Misc. 576, 580, 127 N.Y. Supp. 934, 937 (Sup. Ct. 1911); In re Mc-
Loughlin, 176 App. Div. 653, 163 N.Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dep't 1917).
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tion of the statute appears to be a tortured one. In cases where there are only two
equal stockholders, situations may arise where if such a construction of the meaning
of benefit to stockholders be applied it will be impossible ever to find benefit. Yet
dissolution may be the only feasible course of action. For example, in the case of
In re McLougldin'3 dissolution of a corporation was granted when it was shown that
petitioner, a 50% stockholder, had been completely excluded from any part in the
operation of the business by the other stockholder who proceeded to misappropriate
corporate money and waste it on extravagances to the ultimate destruction of the
business of the corporation and the loss of petitioner's investment. Suppose it had
been shown that the petitioner in that case had in addition a purely personal ad-
vantage to be gained from the corporation's dissolution, such as acquisition of its
assets. Even though all the other statutory requirements were fulfilled, the applica-
tion of the benefit to stockholders requirement, as interpreted by the majority of the
court in the principal case, would appear to preclude the use of the statutory
remedy where its use would be just, convenient and otherwise clearly indicated.
An important consideration which should militate against the adoption of such
a construction of the statute's provisions is the lack of other adequate remedy if
statutory relief is denied. There are cases where dissolution is the only practical
remedy. The Legislative Committee expressly recognized this in its note to the 1944
Amendment of Section 103 when it spoke of dissolution as "sometimes the only
practicable solution for the problems incident to the existence of a deadlock in the
corporation's affairs."'14 The New York courts have not as yet followed the tendency
of the courts of other states in recognizing an inherent power in equity to dissolve
corporations.' 6
From a purely pragmatic standpoint continuance of corporate existence in the face
of an impossible stalemate is extremely unrealistic and can lead only to further legal
battles.'0 Finally, as pointed out in the minority opinion in the instant case, in most
cases, even where the petitioning stockholder is in control of the corporation or
wishes to use corporate dissolution to further his personal interests, an order of dis-
solution can be so constructed as to insure justice to the stockholder opposing the
dissolution.
Aside from these considerations, however, is the basic error in an interpretation
which makes benefit to stockholders co-extensive with selfless motives of the petitioner.
As a general rule, a stockholder has no fiduciary duty towards other stockholders or
towards the corporation.' 7 He is ordinarily entitled to act in furtherance of his
13. In re McLoughlin, supra note 12.
14. 10 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65-k (1944).
15. Denike v. N.Y. and R. L. & C. C. Co., 80 N.Y. 599 (1880). The Legislative Com-
mittee specifically mentioned the New York common law rule in its note referred to above
and pointed out that "except in the instance mentioned above [the statutory provision]
the holders of one-half of the stock of a corporation which has an odd-numbered directorate
are powerless to compel a dissolution." 10 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65-k (1944).
16. "No stockholder is required to continue in a state of constant legal warfare with
the remaining 50% interest." Application of Cohen, 183 Misc. 1034, 1035, 52 N.Y. S. 2d
671 (Sup. Ct. 1944). This was also pointed out in the decision in the principal case by
Pecora, J. at Special Term, 85 N.Y. S. 2d 598, 599 (1948): ". . . continuation of the
relationship between the two stockholders in the same company can neither be beneficial
to them or to the company. The course of this proceeding has not aided in dampening the
fires of discontent between them."
17. Windmuller et al. v. Standard Distilling & Distributing Co. et al., 114 Fed. 491
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personal interest even though it may be distinct from or opposed to the interest of
other stockholders.18 But there are instances where the law will impose a fiduciary
duty on a stockholder. Kavanaugh v. Katvanaughl g is a case in point. There, as
here, a close corporation was involved. Defendants who were majority stockholders
and also the directors of the corporation, after having forced plaintiff's resignation
as an officer of the corporation, voted themselves exorbitant salaries. Plaintiff sued
to restrain payment of the salaries, whereupon defendants voted to dissolve the
corporation under the then Section 221 of the General Corporation Law-20 and thus
rid themselves of plaintiff. Plaintiff was granted judgment restraining defendants from
proceeding and voiding the directors' resolution to dissolve the corporation. The
court, after stating the general rule,2 ' pointed out that: "When a number of stock-
holders constitute themselves, or are by law constituted, the managers of corporate
affairs or interests they stand in much the same attitude towards the other or minority
stockholders that the directors sustain, generally, towards all the stockholders, and
the law requires of them the utmost good faith."22
In the principal case there was no majority or minority. Each of the stockholders
had equal power in ownership and management. From the facts reported in the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions there did not appear to be any basis for denying to
each stockholder the right to act in his own self-interest. It appears to be unfair to
require a co-proprietor of a business to remain in business with an associate with
whom he is unable to agree. A continuation of such discord can hardly be viewed
as beneficial to the two stockholders. Only a strained and unrealistic interpretation
of the requirement that dissolution must be beneficial to the stockholders can produce
such a result. In such a case dissolution would appear to be prima facie beneficial.
(C. C.D. N.J. 1902); Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 2S N.E. 201
(1890).
18. "A shareholder has a legal right at a meeting of shareholders to vote upon a measure,
even though he has a personal interest therein separate from other shareholders. In such
a meeting, each shareholder represents himself and his own interests solely, and he in no
sense acts as a trustee or representative of others. The law of self-interest has at such time
very great and proper sway. There can be little doubt, too, that at such meetings those
who do vote on their own stock vote upon it in the light solely of their own interest, or
at least in what they conceive to be their own interest." Gamble v. Queens County Water
Co., supra note 17 at 97, 25 N. E. at 202. Windmuller et al. v. Standard Distilling & Distrib-
uting Co. et al., supra note 17.
19. 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
20. Under this section the board of directors by a majority vote could adopt a resolution
that in its opinion dissolution was advisable and if the written consent of two-thirds of the
stockholders to the dissolution was obtained the corporation could be dissolved. The
provisions of N.Y. GEN. Coa.'. LAW § 221 are now covered by N.Y. STocn Coax. LAw § 105.
21. "Undoubtedly no trust relation ordinarily exists between the stockholders themselves
or between the stockholders and the corporation, because the stockholders, ordinarily, are
strangers to the management and control of the corporation business and affairs. The
directors, generally speaking, are the exclusive executive representatives of the corporation
and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and
use of its assets. The ordinary trust relation of the directors to the corporation and stock-
holders is not a matter of statutory law, or of technical law. It springs from the fact that
the directors have the control and guidance of the corporate business, affairs and property,
and, hence, of the property interests of the stockholders." 226 N.Y. 185, 194, 123 N.E. 148,
151 (1919).
22. Id. at 195, 123 N.E. at 151.
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A reading of the record on appeal in the principal case discloses some facts, not
referred to in the majority opinion, which might justify the denial of the petition
for dissolution. However, such facts do not compel the broad holding that mere
self-interest of a co-equal stockholder prevents dissolution.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FoREIGN DIVORCE-EFFECT UPON PRIOR NEW YORK DE-
CREE OF SEPARATION.-Husband and wife were validly married in New York where
they resided until 1942 when the wife obtained a decree of separation. In the decree
the husband was ordered to pay alimony and was allowed broad powers of visitation
to a daughter born of the marriage. Fourteen months later the husband established
a residence in Nevada and obtained a decree of absolute divorce, the court having
found that subsequent to the separation decree in New York, the wife began and
continued a course of extreme cruelty. The wife was served in New York, appeared
by attorney in the Nevada action and contested all issues. Though she did not request
an order for the payment of alimony, the defendant continued to pay alimony. In
1948 the plaintiff brought this action to have the support order of the New York
separation decree amended to increase her alimony, and to provide that the husband
pay her further sums for medical expenses. Special Term found that the Nevada
decree relieved defendant of his obligation to support the plaintiff, and he, therefore,
ceased payment. On appeal, held, two justices dissenting, judgment reversed on the
grounds that as far as the provisions for alimony were concerned, the New York
judgment of separation remained in full force and effect, and the Nevada decree in
its entirety was not entitled to full faith and credit in New York. Lyni v. Lynn, 275
App. Div. 269, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (1st Dep't 1949).
The majority opinion set forth three bases for its decision. First, the court held
that because no issue concerning alimony was litigated in the Nevada court, the sup-
port order of the New York separation judgment survived the defendant's foreign
divorce.' To support this position, the majority opinion relied upon the "divisible
divorce doctrine" of Estin v. Estin,2 although the principal case is clearly distinguish-
able from the Estin case. In the Estin case the Nevada court had jurisdiction only
over the marital res because the wife had not appeared in the action brought by the
husband for absolute divorce. It was on the basis of that lack of in personam juris-
diction in the Estin case that the Court of Appeals of New York had held that the
Nevada decree of absolute divorce could not have any effect upon the property rights
of the wife. The wife's right to receive alimony, as established by. a prior New York
separation judgment, was a vested property right.3 The Supreme Court concurred in
this reasoning.4 But in the Nevada action under consideration in the principal case
1. 275 App. Div. 269, 276, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 797 (1st Dep't 1949).
2. Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E. 2d 113 (1947), aff'd, 334 U.S. 541 (1948)
which held that New York was bound to recognize the Nevada divorce decree as far as
dissolution of the marital status was concerned, but not as to the obliteration of the
support order of the New York separation decree.
3. "In Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, we held that alimony unconditionally
and finally owing to a wife under a matrimonial decree is a vested property right of which
she may not be deprived even by way of an act of the legislature. . . . " 296 N. Y. 308,
314, 73 N. E. 2d 113, 115 (1947).
4. 334 U. S. 541, 548 (1948): "Jurisdiction over an intangible can indeed only arise




the foreign court had in persotumn jurisdiction of both parties, and hence it acquired
jurisdiction over both the marital res and the property rights of the wife.
Since the Nevada court had exercised its its personanm jurisdiction only with respect
to the marital status of the parties and not with respect to the husband's obligation
to support his wife, the point was made in the principal case that the wife's personal
appearance in Nevada did not terminate her right to support under the prior New
York judgment. The New York court based this contention upon the record of the
divorce proceedings in Nevada which indicated that the latter court made no ruling
on the issue of alimony, and that it refused to find that the wife had waived her right
to alimony.5 From that evidence the New York court concluded that it was not
obliged to treat as res judicata an issue which could have been litigated in the
foreign court, but which in fact was not litigated there.0
This position raises the question: Must an issue, which involves an incident of
the marital status, be actually litigated for it to be res judicata, or is a party's
opportwzity to litigate that issue a sufficient reason for barring him from raising it in
a subsequent action? In the case of Sherrer v. Sherrer7 that question v.as raised with
respect to the husband's failure to contest the jurisdictional question of the wife's
domicile, despite the fact that he appeared personally in the action. In deciding that
the question was res judicata, Chief Justice Vinson said: "If respondent failed to take
advantage of the opportunities afforded him, the responsibility is his own. We do
not believe that the dereliction of a defendant under such circumstances should be
permitted to provide a basis for subsequent attack in the courts of a sister state on a
decree valid in the State in which it was rendered."8
Admittedly, the question of the wife's right to alimony is not a jurisdictional issue.
But this right to support gives rise to one of the primary duties of the husband and
is one of the most important incidents of the marriage. As such, whether it is con-
tested or ignored by the parties altogether, it is determined by a court's decree
of divorce. It is submitted that if the plaintiff wished to preserve her right to
support, it was her duty to request that an order be included in the Nevada decree
with reference to that right. Her failure to seek such relief should render the question
res judicata, and should preclude her from raising that question in a subsequent
action in a sister state.9 As was stated in the Sherrer case: "That vital interests are
S. 275 App. Div. 269, 276, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 798 (Ist Dep't 1949).
6. Ibid.
7. 334 U. S. 348 (1948). The husband appeared personally in the Florida court, but
he failed to attack the validity of the wife's domicile. After the foreign decree had been
granted, the husband attempted to attack the decree collaterally on the ground that the
wife was not a bona fide domiciliary of Florida at the time when the decree was granted.
8. Id. at 352.
9. In Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933) the plaintiff was the minor
daughter of the defendant, and, in a North Carolina court, she had obtained a modification
of a support order directed to her father by the prior decree of a Georgia court. The
father appealed, and in speaking of the personal appearance of the daughter in the
Georgia action the Court said, "Thus the court acquired complete jurisdiction of the
marriage status and, as an incident, power to finally determine the extent of her father's
obligation to support his minor child.' Id at 211. (italics supplied). In Schuylkll Fuel
Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N. Y. 304, 306, 165 N. B. 466, 457 (1929) the court
said that a judgment in an action is conclusive "not only as to any matters actually liti-
gated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, when the two causes of
action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy
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involved in divorce litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather
than lesser importance that there should be a place to end such litigation. And
where a decree of divorce is rendered by a competent court under the circumstances
of this case, the obligation of full faith and credit requires that such litigation should
end in the courts of the State in which the judgment was rendered."' 0
Although the Nevada court made no positive order concerning alimony, the court
in the principal case held that it was the intention of the Nevada court to keep in
full force and effect the provisions for alimony contained in the New York separa-
tion judgment. The court relied upon the case of Flood v. Thiesing" to support that
holding, but reliance on that case seems to be misplaced in view of its facts. In the
Flood case the parties had entered into a separation agreement which provided for the
support of the wife and, later, they appeared personally in a Nevada divorce action
in which the wife requested that the court make no ruling concerning alimony because
her rights thereto had been settled by agreement of the parties. In the subsequent
action in New York the wife sought to have the agreement enforced as part of the
Nevada decree. The New York court held that the agreement did not become part
of the divorce decree where the Nevada court had not expressly incorporated it
into its judgment, and held further that the husband could dispute the terms of the
separation decree. However, in the Nevada action which is under consideration in the
principal case, the wife made no request for a ruling on the question of alimony.
When the husband requested the court to rule that the wife had waived her right
to alimony by failing to demand it, the Nevada court denied his request, but did not
explain the reason for its denial.12 There was no extra-judicial agreement to settle
the question, and in view of the fact that the Nevada court had refused to recognize
the New York separation judgment as a bar to the husband's action for absolute
divorce,13 it can not be logically contended that the Nevada court would mutely
assent to the survival of any part of that prior New York decree.
Nevada is one of the states which allows an award of alimony to be made in favor
of a wife against whom the divorce decree is granted. 14 If the Nevada court had
intended to continue in full force and effect the support order of the New York
separation judgment, it would have expressly so stated. Under the law of New York,
when an absolute divorce is granted against the wife, her right to alimony is term-
inated. 15 Hence, it is difficult to understand by what authority the courts of New
York can presume to modify or interpolate the Nevada decree to satisfy the New
York conception of what is a just application of Nevada law.
As a final point in the consideration of the wife's right to support, the court in the
principal case argued that the State of New York has a special interest in preventing
its residents from becoming public charges. However, since Estin v. Esthi7l is the
only recent case in which the Supreme Court has given any recognition to the interests
or impair rights or interests established by the first." (Cited in the dissent in the principal
case, 275 App. Div. 269, 281, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 802 (1st Dep't 1949).)
10. 334 U. S. 343, 356 (1948).
11. 273 App. Div. 548, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 453 (1st Dep't 1948), aft'd, 298 N. Y. 700, 82
N. E. 2d 790 (1948).
12. 275 App. Div. 269, 273, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 794 (1st Dep't 1949).
13. Id. at 271, 273, 88 N. Y. S. 2d at 793, 794 (Ist Dep't 1949).
14. Nsv. COMPILED LAws 1929, § 9463 as amended by STAT. OF NEv. 1943, c. 91.
15. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 544 (1948); Turkus v. Turkus, 180 Misc. 857,
858, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
16. See note 2 supra.
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of the state in which the wife resided, it would seem that here the special interest of
the State of New York had been eclipsed by the personal appearance of the parties In
the Nevada action.17 It has long been the public policy in New York that "where
the divorce has been obtained abroad upon personal service and participation, it has
a binding effect on everybody, not merely upon the parties and their privies'1 8 and
further, as was stated by Walter, J., in his decision in the principal case at Special
Term: "To make a man continue to support a woman who is no longer his w.ife be-
cause without such support she might become a public charge, would be just as
lacking in sense ... as to refuse a divorce to a man who proved that his wife com-
mitted adultery because the wife might become a public charge if divorced.' 0 Thus,
it would appear neither practicable nor logical to rule in effect that, even though a
foreign court had in personanz jurisdiction over both parties, the courts of New York
are courts of appeal from the decisions of the forums of a sister state.
The second reason which the court adopted for rendering judgment in favor of the
wife was that the husband was estopped from asserting that the Nevada decree of
absolute divorce was res judicata, or that it precluded the wife from subsequently
seeking a modification of the support order of the New York separation decree.20
Here, the court had reference to the true doctrine of equitable estoppel, and not to
the "quasi-estoppel" rule which has been applied so often in cases of attack upon the
validity of a foreign divorce.21 The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been described
by one authority as follows: "When one party to a transaction has by his representa-
tions, either express or to be fairly implied by his conduct or silence, obtained an un-
fair advantage over the other, he will not be allowed to avail himself of it in a
judicial proceeding.2 2 Neither fraud nor intention to deceive are necessary for a
party to be estopped by his conduct.23 For approximately sir years after the date
of the Nevada decree the husband continued to pay alimony in accordance with the
New York decree of separation. Under a rule of the District Court of Nevada a party
17. In the Estin case Justice Douglas expressed his recognition of the state's interest as
follows: "New York was rightly concerned lest the abandoned spouse be left impoverished
and perhaps become a public charge. The problem of her livelihood and support is plainly
a matter in which her community had a legitimate interest. . . . But the question is
whether Nevada could under any circumstances adjudicate rights of respondent under the
New York judgment when she was not personally served or did not appear in the pro-
ceeding." 334 U. S. 541, 547 (1948).
18. Lenhoff, The Rationale of the Recognition of Foreign Divorces in New Yorp, 16
FoRD. L. Rxv. 231, 236 (1947). In the Nevada action discussed in the principal case, the
wife was not served personally within the jurisdiction of the Nevada court, but MAr. Len-
hoff suggests in note 31 of his article that this is not important where the defendant appears
personally in the action.
19. 192 Misc. 720, 726, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 397, 404 (Sup. Ct 194S).
20. 275 App. Div. 269, 277, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 798 (Ist Dep't 1949).
21. See Lenhoff, The Rationale of the Recognition of Foreign Divorces in New York,
16 FoRD. L. REv. 231 (1947).
22. CLApm, PpINc .mEs oF EQurry § 29 (2d ed. 1937).
23. "A false representation acted upon by the person misled results in an estoppel of the
misrepresentor from denying the truth of his statement. He must make good the truth of
his representation whether he made it innocently or not." WALsu, E4QutnY 511 (1st ed.
1930).
But, "Like fraud, to which it is closely related, estoppel cannot be confined within
any strict definition." AcLrxrocY-, HADBoOK ow EQuity § 44 (1st ed. 1936).
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desiring to have a judgment modified must make the appropriate motion within six
months after such judgment was rendered. 24 If the Nevada divorce decree dissolved
all obligations of the marriage, as the husband contended, then he was not required
to pay alimony after the divorce became final. The prevailing opinion contended that
by continuing to pay alimony the husband lulled the wife into a false sense of security
and that she was misled until it was too late for her to move for a modification of
the divorce decree. 25 Because of this conduct, which it is claimed misled the wife
to her detriment, the court held the husband was estopped from pleading the Nevada
decree as a bar to the wife's action. The court cited Rothschild v. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. 26 as authority for its holding. In the Rothschild case the son of the
owner of certain real property obtained a loan from the defendant bank by forging
the owner's name to a bond and mortgage. The owner learned about this deception,
but did not notify the defendant of the forgery; instead, she paid two instalments of
interest on the mortgage. The executrix of the deceased owner sought to have the
mortgage cancelled on the ground that it was a forgery and void. The court held
that the payment of interest by the owner, when she knew of the forgery, worked
an equitable estoppel against her and her successor in interest. The rule of the
Rothschild case is not applicable here; in that case the conduct of the owner which
misled the defendant was coupled with the concealment of a material fact, namely
that the mortgage was a forgery. If, in the instant case, the continued payment of
alimony deterred the wife from pursuing her remedy under the Nevada statute, the
fault lies with her. She was as cognizant of her right to a modification of the decree
as was the husband, and there was no duty on his part to notify her of that right.
It was through her own lack of vigilance that the wife lost her right to a modification,
and it is submitted that that is an answer to the contention that his conduct lulled
her into a false sense of security.
The court's third and final reason in support of its decision 27 stems from the fact
that the husband based his Nevada action for absolute divorce upon an allegation of
"a course of extreme cruelty" begun by the wife during the married life of the
parties and continued by her after they had been legally separated.28 Apparently
ignoring the husband's allegations, or perhaps cognizant of the fact that the New
York decree was res judicata on the husband's acts of cruelty before the separation
decree, the Nevada court granted its decree on the ground that subsequent to their
separation under the New York decree, the wife began and continued a course of
extreme cruelty against the husband.20 Thus the Nevada court did not base its
findings on any facts which had been previously adjudicated in the New York action
for separation. It is submitted, then, that the observations by the court in the prin-
cipal case that the Nevada court had not given full faith and credit to the prior
New York decree which had settled the personal status of the parties, and was res
judicata as to the acts of cruelty committed before the separation decree, was not an
issue in the principal case. Since the Nevada court granted the divorce decree only
on the basis of acts of cruelty committed after the separation,3 0 it did give full faith
24. Rule XLV of the Rules of the District Court of Nevada. It might very well have
been in consideration of this rule that the Nevada court refrained from making a ruling
with regard to the wife's right to alimony.
25. 275 App. Div. 269, 277, 88 N.Y. S. 2d 791, 799 (1st Dep't 1949).
26. 204 N. Y. 458, 97 N. E. 879 (1912).
27. 275 App. Div. 269, 279, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 800 (1st Dep't 1949).
28. Id. at 271, 88 N. Y. S. 2d at 793.




and credit to the New York decree. The acts referred to above consisted of an
assault upon the husband by the wife on one occasion, and of refusing to allow him
to see his daughter despite the fact that the separation decree allowed him broad
powers of visitation. The New York court ruled that after the separation was
granted, the wife owed no further duty except that of chastity to her husband,
and that those acts committed after separation were not grounds for granting an
absolute divorce under any principles of common law, or any statute of Nevada. 3'
The court cited no case authority for its ruling, and apparently it is a question
which has not been previously litigated.
It is submitted that this question deserves more consideration; the right of the
husband to base his action on such grounds depends upon the duties owed to him by
his wife after the limited divorce had been granted. She owed him more than the
single duty of chastity. In People ex rel. Commissioners of Charities v. Culens 2
the court analyzed the process of determining the rights and liabilities of separated
parties as follows: "An action for a limited divorce is really an appeal to a court of
equity by one of the parties to a marriage contract for a modification of the marriage
relations, duties and obligations as they exist at common law.... The court is virtu-
ally asked to change and readjust these relations and to prescribe such new duties
and obligations to be observed by the litigants as justice may require. Such a decree,
when made, is the charter that, during the separation, must regulate the obligations
and duties of the parties'l 33 In the New York separation decree, obtained by the
plaintiff in the principal case, the court allowed the husband broad rights of visitation
to the child of the marriage; hence, the wife became obligated to allow the husband
to visit their daughter. She did not perform that duty. That raises the question as
to whether a Nevada court can grant an absolute divorce against a defendant who
has breached a duty that was imposed by a New York separation judgment. Part
of the answer to that question may be found in the proposition that the judgments
of the courts of one state are entitled to full faith and credit and must be enforced in
the forums of sister states. When the husband, a bona fide domiciliary of Nevada,
entered the court of that state seeking relief from a violation of his rights, as
established by a New York judgment, the Nevada court had no choice except to decree
an absolute divorce. It would serve no useful purpose for the court to issue a manda-
tory injunction against the wife because of the difficulty of enforcement.
It is further submitted that the acts of cruelty, assuming the cruelty was extreme,
committed after the separation decree provided a valid ground for granting an abso-
lute divorce. Under the Nevada Compiled Laws of 1929: "Divorce from the bonds
of matrimony may be obtained . . . for the following causes. . . .Sixth-Extreme
cruelty in either party."3 4 That statute does not require that the parties be living
together at the time of the alleged acts; nor does the statute provide that a separa-
tion decree deprives the parties of their right to a divorce under it. If a Nevada
court has decided that legally separated parties may be divorced for acts of extreme
cruelty committed by one of them after the date of the separation, it is not within
the power of the courts of New York to overrule a Nevada court's construction
of its own state statute.
In conclusion it is submitted that, considered together, the court's reasons in sup-
port of its decision have all but destroyed the significance of the Estin and Sherrer
cases in New York, and, by its failure to take the "whole view", the court has con-
tributed only more confusion to an already chaotic legal problem.
31. Id. at 279, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
32. 153 N. Y. 629, 47 N. E. 894 (1897).
33. Id. at 637, 47 N. E. at 895.
34. NEv. Co2rr'u.an LAWS 1929 § 9460.
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EQUITY-POWER OF COURT TO ENJOIN ELECTIONS.-The City Council of Austin,
Texas passed an ordinance calling for an election in order to nominate a council-
man to fill an unexpired term in the council caused by the resignation of a former
member. This ordinance was in direct violation of the City Charter of Austin which
expressly declared that all vacancies, other than those created as a result of recall,
shall be filled by the council itself. The plaintiff, a taxpayer of the City of Austin,
brought suit to enjoin the holding of the invalid election in order to prevent the
illegal expenditure of public funds involved therein. The District Court denied a
temporary injunction on the ground that equity can not interfere to enjoin an
election, whether void or not. On appeal, judgment for the City was reversed and
judgment awarded the plaintiff on the ground that an injunction may be ordered
at the suit of a taxpayer to restrain the unlawful expenditure of public funds. Upon
further appeal, held, four justices dissenting, judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals reversed and judgment of the District Court for defendant affirmed. City
of Austin v. Thompson, 219 S. W. 2d 57 (Tex. 1949).
It has been generally stated that courts of equity have no authority to interfere
in purely political matters.' Free elections constitute an important part of the
political life of government in the United States since they are the means, im-
plemented and formalized by the legislatures, through which is ultimately ex-
ercised the natural right and power of the people to rule through their duly chosen
representatives. Therefore, to interfere with an election is to interfere with a matter
which affects the people's right to rule and be ruled, i.e., a political matter.
There are various reasons given for the refusal of equity to interfere in purely
political matters. Originally equity was held to be excluded from the protection
of political rights because its function was to protect only property rights. 2 How-
ever, the view that equity protects property rights only is a fast disappearing con-
cept and no longer holds much weight in modem equity jurisprudence. 3 Equity's
jurisdiction has been broadened and the property right theory should no longer be
invoked as a valid justification for the refusal to entertain political questions."
However, it may well be that the single judge sitting as a court of equity will be
reluctant to render a decision which, irrespective of its outcome, will tend to
encroach upon the inherent right of the people peacefully to assemble and conduct
their political affairs through the medium of the election. Thus an injunction
ordered by one judge, which seemingly thwarts the public from expressing their will,
might be regarded as an indiscreet use of equity's powers.5 For this reason the
historical doctrine of the separation of powers has been invoked as a strong argu-
ment in opposition to equity's authority to interfere in political matters.0 By virtue
of this theory each branch of the government has certain functions peculiar to
1. Joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 147 So. 273 (1933); Brumfield v. Brock, 169 Miss.
784, 142 So. 745 (1932).
2. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1746 (4th ed. 1919). Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818) (In this case an injunction was sought to
restrain the publication of certain letters belonging to the plaintiff, but in the possession
of the defendant. The Chancellor ordered the injunction, but not before he determined
that the plaintiff had a sufficient property right in the letters in order to authorize the
injunction).
3. 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 648 (1930).
4. Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N. E. 2d 241 (1946).
5. Simpson, 50 Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 222 (1936).
6. See POMEROY, supra note 2 at § 1753.
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itself. The legislature and judiciary are each limited to their own fields with
justiciable questions being decided by the judicial arm of the government and
political matters by the legislative branch. One court, in reviewing this problem,
asserted that if the system of checks and balances were not maintained and the
judiciary were permitted to usurp the functions of the legislature, the structure of
the government would be weakened.
7
Were it to be assumed however, that equity has jurisdiction to interfere in
election disputes, and that the injunction is not an indiscreet use of its power, a
further question still remains. Is there an adequate remedy at law? A first principle
of equity jurisprudence is that equity will not invoke its authority over any
matter when an adequate remedy can be found at laws and it has been held that
equity will refuse to entertain jurisdiction over political matters for this reason.0
The most general legal remedy in cases involving election disputes is the writ of
quo warranto. If a claimant holds public office as a result of an alleged unlawful
election, his right to retain that office can be tested by quo warranto proceedings.
If, in such an action, the election is found to be void for any reason, the person
holding office will be ousted.10
Despite the arguments in support of the general rule prohibiting equity from
interfering in political questions, many courts have found the rule to be inapplicable
under certain circumstances. The state of Washington, in the case of Gibson v.
Campbell' proceeded on the theory that an election which is a political matter
per se may become justiciable in nature when it violates the laws of the state
regulating its conduct. There the court stated that even though a recall election
is a political question, "the question as to whether or not the proceedings looking
to the recall . . . comply with the constitutional and statutory law upon the subject
is purely and wholly a judicial question."'" It has also been held that equity may
enjoin political proceedings when civil property rights are involved therein,' 3 but
the majority of courts which grant the relief have based their decisions on the
basis of enjoining the illegal expenditure of public funds.' 4 In all of these cases
7. Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S. W. 177, aff'd, 178 U. S. 548 (1900).
8. BIspmax, PRnz.x .s or EQurrvy, § 39 (7th ed. 1907).
9. McAlister v. State ex rel. Short, 95 Okla. 200, 219 Pac. 134 (1923).
10. See notes 16 and 17 infra and accompanying text.
11. 136 Wash. 467, 241 Pac. 21 (1925).
12. Id. at 472, 241 P'ac. at 23.
13. Miller v. City of Chicago, 348 111. 34, 180 N. E. 627 (1932).
14. Griffith v. Board of Education of Forsyth County, 183 N. C. 40S, 112 S. E. 10
(1922). In this case an election was called to determine the will of the voters in respect
to a tax for a proposed school district. It was enjoined by the court, the holding being
that a taxpayer may bring suit to enjoin an election when it is clear that there is no
authority for calling the election and that in holding it, a waste of public funds would
result. Solomon v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 40, 51 N. IV. 304 (1892) involved an election con-
cerning the location of the county seat. The election was enjoined on the ground that
an illegal election would result in a waste of public funds raised by taxation, and over
such a waste, equity has the power to act. In Baum v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 73S,
123 S. W. 2d 48 (1938) the court enjoined an election which bad not been recommended
by the proper board in accordance with the provisions of the City Charter which re-
quired such action in order to save the taxpayers the illegal expense that would follow
a void election. In Gulick v. Linn, 90 Okla. 201, 216 Pac. 460 (1923) an election called
to determine if certiin townships should be detached from one county and proposed into
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equity assumed jurisdiction over the elections,, their political nature notwith-
standing, because the issue involved was not the sanctity of the election, but the
security of the public funds. If it were determined that the public funds were being
put to an unlawful use, equity would intervene to enjoin the use; and once it was
enjoined anything incident to it would necessarily fall with it. Since the paramount
issue involved in these cases was the use to which the public funds were being
put, it can be argued that the courts considered the elections, when allied with
their necessary incident of expense, as no longer purely political in nature. However,
the actions were maintained by the taxpayers and countenanced by the courts on
the ground that equity does have jurisdiction to enjoin the illegal expenditure of
public funds per se.15 Continuing from that premise, it can only be a short step
to the logical conclusion that an unlawful use of public funds will always be
enjoined, whether a political matter is concerned therewith or not.
Proceeding on this theory, it is apparent that the remedy at law is inadequate,
While equity leaves the taxpayer to quo warranto when the issue raised is the
authority by which an elected official holds his office, it seems to provide the only
recourse when the issue raised is the authority by which the election itself is
conducted. The injunction is manifestly the only remedy possible when a taxpayer
is seeking to prevent a waste of public funds in conducting an election. When this
is the sole issue as it was in the principal case, a proceeding in quo warranto will
avail the plaintiff nothing. Quo warranto is only instituted after the election has
transpired and the mere ouster of an unlawful office holder will not refill the public
treasury. The plaintiff in the principal case had no interest in who was to fill the
vacancy in the City Council. His sole concern was over the waste of public funds,
yet the court refused to consider this most important question. Prior to the principal
case the state of Texas has allowed taxpayers to maintain an action to prevent the
illegal expenditure of public funds per se, on the ground that the taxpayer has an
equitable interest therein, 16 but now, by virtue of its decision in the instant case, it
a new one was enjoined by the court as violating express law and involving an illegal
expenditure of public funds.
15. The question of whether or not a court of equity may enjoin an election on the
ground of illegal expenditures of public funds naturally involves the more primary ques-
tion of whether or not a court of equity may enjoin the illegal expenditures of public
funds per se. Some jurisdictions refuse to allow a taxpayer to maintain such an action
unless he can show some special interest in addition to his status as taxpayer. Bull v.
Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (3d Dep't 1948). Oregon allows the
action by statute, but the statute is limited to proceedings against municipal officers.
Ore. Laws 1939, c. 272 § 110-1217. Arizona allows the action against both state and
municipal officials by its statute. Aaxz. CODE ArN. § 12-501, 12-503 and AMz. CODE ANN.
§ 17-325, 17-326 (1939). The same is true of the state of Kansas. KA. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1121 (1935).
Furthermore, in the majority of states dealing with the problem, taxpayers, by virtue
of judicial decisions, without showing anything further, may maintain the action against state
and municipal officials indiscriminately. Comment, Taxpayer's Action Against State Officials
To Prevent Alleged Unconstitutional Use O State Funds, 17 FORD. L. REv. 107 (1948).
The most interesting thing to be noted here is that Texas is one of the most liberal of all
states in this direction. It has maintained that the taxpayer has an equitable interest
in the public funds to which he has directly contributed and so has a sufficient interest
to maintain the action. Sherman v. Cage, 279 S. W. 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
16. Sherman v. Cage, 279 S. W. 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
[Vol. 18
RECENT DECISIONS
disallows the action when it involves an election. Those who are in charge of public
funds and those who make the necessary public expenditures therefrom can only
act under color of political authority when they perform this function. It is sub-
mitted that it is no more a political function to expend funds in the performance
of an illegal election ordinance than it is to expend funds in the carrying out of an
illegal order of a highway commission.' 7
Furthermore, even if the question of the public funds is not to be considered,
it would still appear that the Texas court erred in its decision in the principal case
in holding that the election was a political matter not subject to interference by in-
junction. In Thompson v. Talmadge,'8 a Georgia court distinguished between the
discretionary powers and the ministerial powers of a political body, allowing
equity's interference in the former.' 9 In the principal case the charter of the City
of Austin specifically provided that when vacancies occur in the City Council,
other than by recall, they are to be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term
by the council itself.20 All discretion is removed from the hands of the council
(except as to the particular individual selected) in filling the vacancy. They are
in clear and precise terms prohibited from calling an election and, on the contrary,
are specifically directed to proceed in only one way. Thus, it would appear that
the duty of the City Council amounted to a purely ministerial power.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is unound and that the Texas
court has misapplied an equitable maxim which is of questionable validity.
TRADE M nKs-T nE NA.us AND UNFAIR CoMPEr rnoN-NEwco= s' RiGHT
TO USE SURNAME UNDER THE LANIHA7L Acr.-Plaintiff manufactures floor cleaners,
varnishes, brushes, enamels, lacquers, waxes for automobiles and furniture polishes
which are nationally distributed under an established common law trade-mark, reg-
istered under the provisions of the Federal Trade Mark Act of 1905. Defendant com-
pany manufactures a general household cleaner which is packaged and advertised
as "Johnson's Cleaner" under an unregistered label that originally bore a strildng
similarity to the plaintiff's well-known trade mark. In a previous litigation the
District Court found that the defendant's product was of the same descriptive prop-
erties and caused confusion among plaintiff's customers and enjoined the use of the
name. The Court of Appeals modified the lower court's holding. In the present
litigation the plaintiff has revived the old controversy and has claimed a right to
further protection under the Lanham Act. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. Upon appeal, held, one judge dis-
senting, affirmed on the ground that the Lanham Act did no more than make protec-
tion of the new act coextensive with the common law of unfair competition as it was
in 1946. S. C. Johnson & Sons, IBc. v. Johnson et al., 175 F. 2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949).1
It is well settled that the law of trade-marks is only a part of the law of unfair
competition,2 "the general purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing
17. Ibid.
18. 201 Ga. 867, 41 S. E. 2d 883 (1947).
19. Ibid.
20. Cy y CHARTER or Austn, TEXAS, Art. XVIII, § 2.
1. Petition for writ of certiorari (No. 294) denied Oct. 24, 1949 by the United States
Supreme Court.
2. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916). See De Funiak, Equitable
Protection of Business and Business Rights, 35 Ky. L. J. 261 (1947).
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off his goods or his business as the goods or business of another."3 The common law
right to protection of a trade-mark or trade name arose from priority of adoption
and use of such mark or name in connection with an established business. This right
is independent of, and superior to, any rights acquired under either federal or state
registration acts. 4 The principal advantage afforded by statutory enactments is that
registration of a trade-mark constitutes prima facie evidence of exclusive title to the
mark.5 If the trade-mark is not registered in the Patent Office, under provisions of
one or more of the statutes, the plaintiff asserting a common law right against an
alleged infringer has the burden of proving his prior and continued use of such mark.0
The use required to establish a common law trade-mark must be deliberate and
continuous, though not necessarily extensive; it must not be sporadic, secretive,
confidential, casual, fortuitous, experimental or transitory. 7
Because of the generally assumed right of an individual to use his own name on
products of his own manufacture, disputes have often arisen between competitors
having the same or similar surnames.8 In the past the courts have not hesitated to
hold that a surname cannot be appropriated for exclusive use as a trade-name.0  On
the other hand it has been repeatedly held that a newcomer in a competitive field
may be restrained from certain uses of his own surname where such use is calculated
to deceive customers,10 or where the natural tendency of such use will be to mislead
the public," or where the way is opened for dealers to create confusion in the mind
of the public.12 In such cases the competitive newcomer may be compelled to add
some distinguishing words if he chooses to use even his own surname.13
3. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1925). As to unfair
competition by palming off another's goods or services as one's own, see International News
Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
4. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1925); Beckwith v.
Comm'r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920).
5. Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch-Case Co., 179 U. S. 665, 672 (1901),
affirming 94 Fed. 667 (7th Cir. 1899).
6. Carroll v. Duluth Superior Milling Co., 232 Fed. 675 (8th Cir. 1916).
7. Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Sons, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E. D. Pa. 1934).
8. Wallach Bros. v. Wallack, 200 App. Div. 169, 192 N. Y. Supp. 723 (1st Dep't 1922);
Bernhard v. Bernhard, 156 App. Div. 739, 142 N.Y. Supp. 94 (1st Dep't 1913); Marcus
Ward & Co. v. Ward, 61 Hun. 625, 15 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1891); Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb.
76 (N. Y. 1857).
9. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 24 F. Supp. 481,
aff'd, 105 F. 2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939); J. B. Stetson Co. v. S. L. Stetson Co., 85 F. 2d 586
(2d Cir. 1936); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(7th Cir. 1912); Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 (1890).
10. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88 (1914) ; Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff,
Seamans & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118 (1905) ; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877) ; Sttx,
Baer & Fuller Dry Goods Co. v. American Piano Co., 211 Fed. 271 (8th Cir. 1913) ; Higgins
Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 39 N. E. 490 (1895).
11. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 (1914) ; Herring-Hall-Marvln
Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554 (1908); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F.
2d 962 (3d Cir. 1925).
12. J. B. Stetson Co. v. S. L. Stetson Co., 85 F. 2d 586 (2d Cir. 1936); Cheese-
borough Mfg. Co. v. Old Gold Chemical Co., 70 F. 2d 383 (6th Cir. 1934); John H.
Woodbury Inc. v. William A. Woodbury Corp., 23 F. Supp. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
13. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88 (1914); Thaddeus Davids Co.
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Somewhat more recently in the development of trade-mark law injunctive relief
has been extended to owners of existing trade-marks against newcomers who attempt
to use such marks on non-competing goods.14 Previously the Federal Trade Mark Act
of 1905 had limited the right to enjoin an infringer only when he should "affix" the
registered mark "to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties." In
applying this statute the courts had been confronted with the question of whether
the language of the legislature referred to the physical character of the goods alone,
or whether it also covered any goods which might reasonably be supposed to come
from the trade-mark proprietor. Courts have differed in their interpretation of this
phrase in the 1905 Act, the weight of authority holding to the more restricted %iew.25
The Second Circuit, however, adopted the more liberal interpretation in a number of
cases.16
In 1928 the present federal rule, popularly known as the "Hand Doctrine", which
had been suggested by some earlier decisions,l 7 was laid down by Judge Learned
Hand in Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson.'8 This doctrine extended trade-
mark protection to the use of a copied mark on noncompeting goods where the article
bearing the copied symbol was a product which might be reasonably expected to
come from the plaintiff. In this case the court refused registration of the mark
"Yale" for flash lights when opposed by the owner of the same mark for locks and
keys. Development of this doctrine resulted from the limitation of the then existing
statutes which granted the right to enjoin an infringing mark only in cases where
the defendant used the mark on "goods of substantially the same descriptive prop-
erties." The "Hand Doctrine" has since been followed in some other jurisdictions as
well as in the Second Circuit,' 9 although it could not be said to represent the weight
of authority prior to the passage of the Lanham Act.20 In the Johnson case which
came before the Court of Appeals in 1940 the court stated: ". . . when a good will
v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 (1914); Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe
Co., 208 U.S. 554 (1908); J. B. Stetson Co. v. S. L. Stetson Co., SS F. 2d 5S86 (2d Cir.
1936); Walker Baker & Co. v. Sanders et al., 80 Fed. 889 (2d Cir. 1897); Clark Thread
Co. v. Armitage, 74 Fed. 936 (2d Cir. 1896); Nolan Bros. Shoe Co. v. Nolan, 131 Cal. 271,
63 Pac. 480 (1900); Brown Sheet Iron & Steel Co. v. Brown Steel Tank Co., 198 Minn.
276, 269 N.W. 633 (1936).
14. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) where the
established pancake flour trade-mark was held to be infringed by defendant's use of the
same mark on syrup, even though plaintiff did not make or sell syrup.
15. Walgreen Drug Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F. 2d 956 (Sth Cir. 1940);
Beechnut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F. 2d 967 (3d Cir. 1925); Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Elliott, 7 F. 2d 962 (3d Cir. 1925) ; Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398
(8th Cir. 1913); Triangle Publictions, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 73 F. Supp. 74 (S.D. N.Y. 1947);
Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
16. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) ; Aunt Jemima Mills
Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
19. Del Monte Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir.
1929); Gre;t Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp. 703 (E. D.
Pa. 1937); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487
(S.D. N.Y. 1929); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E.
30 (1933).
20. See note 15 supra.
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is established under the owner's name, given or assumed, he may protect it, not
only against the competition of those who invade his market, but also against those
who use the name to sell goods near enough alike to confuse his customers." 21 In
applying the doctrine, a trade-mark owner's right to prohibit another from copying
his trade-mark on noncompeting goods has been generally limited to cases where the
owner established either one of two recognized interests: First, that injunctive relief
was necessary to protect his established reputation from possible injury which might
result from the public's confusion as to the source or origin of the infringer's goods;
or second, his possible wish or need to expand his own business into the disputed
market.22 In discussing these requirements when the parties in the principal case
were before the Second Circuit earlier, the court, finding no threat of injury to plain-
tiff's reputation, further said: "Unless therefore he can show that, in order to hold
or develop his present business, he must preserve his identity in the disputed market,
he cannot rely upon the second of the two interests at stake."23
The Lanham Act apparently intended to incorporate the "Hand Doctrine" into
the statutory law of trade-marks by eliminating the limitations of the older acts to
protection where goods were of "substantially the same descriptive properties. ' -" 4
Thus, in Section 32 of the new act, trade-mark infringement in commerce is defined
as "use, without consent of the registrant, of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation of any registered mark . . . which . . . use is likely to cause con-
fusion or mistake or to confuse purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods."2 5
21. S. C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
22. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
23. 116 F. 2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
24. That it was the intent of the Legislature to broaden the trademark law Is dearly
recognized by all of the Lanham Act's protagonists. The eminent authority, Dr. Walter J.
Derenberg, trade-mark counsel to the U. S. Patent Office, in an article for laymen which
appeared in Fortune, Feb. 1949, p. 147, heralded the expansion of trade-mark law by the
broadening provisions of the new act and the added protection which it affords. Miss
Daphne Robert, another recognized authority on the law of trademarks, author of TnE
NEw TPDE MAiu MANuu (1947), stresses the change in wording from the former statute
which is here in issue and goes on to say of the new act: "The goods or services need not
be identical or even remotely related if it is shown that purchasers are likely to be misled
by the mark into thinking that the same concern is selling, offering for sale or advertising
the goods or services of both parties, relief will be granted."
25. Trade Mark Act of 1946, § 32 (italics supplied). "(1) Any person who shall, in com-
merce, (a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods
or services; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection
with the sale in commerce of such goods or services, shall be liable to a civil action by the
registrant for any or all of the remedies hereinafter provided, except that under subsection
(b) of this section the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless
the acts have been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers." The term 'colorable imitation' Includes
any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive purchasers." Section 45 Lanham Act. 60 STAT. 437, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
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Clearly, as is stated by Chief Judge Learned Hand in the majority opinion in the
principal case, the act "did indeed put federal trade-mark law upon a new footing."20
It substituted a broad new definition granting recovery for any use "likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers." These broadening provisions, which
are in complete accord with the well known intent of the legislation's sponsors to
broaden trade-mark protection, are also substantially in accord with the common law of
trade-marks as developed by the courts.27
While recognizing that the Lanham Act does in fact accord greater protection to
trade-mark owners than was heretofore provided by the old statutes, the court in the
principal case has held that it does not go so far as to allow every first user to
stifle all excursions into adjacent markets upon showing no more than that confusion
would result. The majority view is that even under the test of the new act, the
same considerations which led to the earlier issuance of a qualified injunction still
apply, and if confusion between the plantiff's and defendant's marks continues that
may be attributed to the original weakness of the plaintiff's mark.
The rationale of the decision may be found in Judge Hand's statement when the
present disputants were previously before the Court of Appeals where he wrote:
"When all is said, if a man allows the good will of his business to become identified
with a surname so common as Johnson, it is fair to impose upon him some of the
risk that another Johnson may wish to sell goods not very far afield; and he must
show a substantial interest if he would seriously impair the second Johnson's priv-
ilege to use his own name in customary ways.!'s
If the plaintiff had a justiciable grievance, i.e., if he could show either (1) that his
business is directly injured by defendant's alleged infringement, (2) that his estab-
lished reputation is threatened by defendant's practices or inferior product, or (3)
that it is necessary for him to preserve his identity in the disputed market in order
to hold or develop his present business, then he would be entitled to further relief
without recourse to the Lanham Act. The majority opinion of the court in the
present case suggests that Section 32 of the Lanham Act has not changed plaintiff's
substantive rights, but rather it has codified the common law as developed by the
courts since the 1905 Act.
In his dissenting opinion Judge Clark argued that the history of the new trade-
mark law during its long period of germination in the Halls of Congress, before its
emergence as the Lanham Act of 1946, dearly indicate that it was intended to be
much more than merely "declaratory of existing common law" 23 as the majority of
the court here has held. The dissenting judge further observes: "But unfortunately
there does not appear to be a quite clear law of 1946, as I fear those who have
struggled with our decisions such as Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, compared
with Best & Co. v. Miller, will understand" 30
That there has been much confusion in the field of trade-mark law cannot be de-
nied; but the present decision, rather than adding to the confusion as the dissenting
opinion suggests, appears to clarify the subject on at least one point, namely, that
the federal rule, or "Hand Doctrine", as codified by the Lanham Act, will not be
extended to enjoin the use of his own surname by a noncompeting defendant, even
26. 175 F. 2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949).
27. See note 2 supra; see also Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Confiion of
Source: Need For Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. Rxv. 214 (1949).
28. 116 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1940).




though such use may result in confusion as to the source or origin of defendant's
products. Thus the effect of the present decision seems to be to limit the application
of Section 32 of the Lanham Act to strong, distinctive, or "fabricated"' trade-marks,
and not to include the use of a surname. In what may be considered a very signifi-
cant dictum, Judge Learned Hand suggests that different considerations should apply
to a case involving a "fabricated" mark.
5 2
TRADE REGULATIONS-ExCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS-STANDARD OF PROOF RE-
QUIRED UNDER THE CLAYTON AcT.-Defendant corporation, a producer and refiner
of petroleum products, sold its products in its own service stations, to independent
service stations, and to industrial users. The corporation was the largest seller of
gasoline (23% of total sales) in the "western area". Defendant's sales of gasoline
to independent dealers under exclusive dealing contracts were 6.7% of the total
gasoline sold in that area. These exclusive dealing contracts, which were similar
to contracts used by the defendant's major competitors, bound the dealers to buy all
of their requirements of one or more products from the defendant from year to
year, though they could be terminated at the end of six months. Since replacing
its agency agreements with the exclusive dealing contracts in 1936 defendant's
proportion of the total gasoline sales remained at about the same level; its sales
of other products were slightly higher, but have never exceeded more than 2%
of the total sales in that area. The District Court enjoined the defendant from
enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with any independent dealer
in petroleum products and automobile accessories on the grounds that such con-
tracts violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, three Justices dissenting,
judgment affirmed on the ground that proof that the agreements affect a sub-
stantial portion of commerce satisfied the requirement of the statute that the effect
of the agreements "may be to substantially lessen competition"; proof need not be
offered that there has been an actual or probable lessening of competition. Standard
Oil of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
The Court did not consider it necessary to determine the legality of the contracts
31. The classic example of a strong, distinctive fabricated trademark is "Kodak". In a
recent article on this subject, Brown, Advertising And The Public Interest: Legal Protection
Of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165 (1948), it is suggested that "the Eastman Kodak
Company can probably prevent anyone from calling almost anything Kodak." And, indeed,
the Eastman Company has enjoined the use of Kodak for bicycles in Eastman Photo
Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 R. P. C. 105 (1898). But cf. California Fruit Growers
Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947).
32. "If Congress really meant to allow every first user of a mark so to stifle all
excursions into adjacent markets upon showing no more than that confusion would result,
it seems to us that it would have said so more clearly. In the case of fabricated marks
which have no significance, save as they denote a single source of origin of the goods to
which they are attached, the first user's right may indeed go so far. The second user can
then show no interest of his own; and if, as will then appear, his only purpose is to trade
on the first user's good will, it is indeed time to intervene. That situation is polar to this.
and we do not believe that both have been swept into a common condemnation by the




in question with reference to the broad provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,'
for it held that the contracts violated the narrower provisions of Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. 2 Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that "it shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce ...to ...make a sale or contract for sale
of goods ... on the condition, agreement or understanding that .. . purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the
...seller, where the effect of such ...sale, or contract for sale ...may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce."
Section 3 of the Clayton Act has never been interpreted in a case sufficiently
similar in its facts to those in the instant case as to be a precedent for the instant
case. But, the Court has held that the economic consequences of agreements vithin
the scope of the Clayton Act need not be considered where there have been
"patent tying" arrangements,3 or "exclusive dealing" arrangements,4 when the de-
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1941), as amended, S0 STAT. 693 (1937), IS
U. S. C. § 1 (1941). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal....2
2. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1941).
3. In "patent tying" arrangements, generally, the defendant owns the patent rights
to a useful, and sometimes necessary, machine which it leases or sells upon the con-
dition that the lessee or buyer purchase all unpatented goods or other machinery used
with the machine from the lessor or seller. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U. S. 392 (1947); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131
(1936); United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
4. The Court referred to exclusive dealing contracts as exclusive supply contracts or
requirements contracts. Although exclusive dealing contracts are requirements contracts
it is loose usage to refer to them as such, for another type of requirements contract is
the "requirements contract on the manufacturing level" (sometimes referred to as
"requirements contract for use of consumer"). The exclusive dealing contract is some-
times referred to as "requirements contract on the retail level." The designation "re-
quirements contract on the manufacturing level" is used when a consumer orders all of
his needs of an article from the seller, e.g., when a manufacturer is unable to estimate his
needs of certain products until shortly before he begins production. This is usually due
to an uncertain supply of other products used or to unpredictable consumer demand. This
type of contract permits the buyer to operate on a closer margin for it saves him from
overstocking, storage expenses, and from higher prices for late orders if he underestimates
his needs. Stockhausen, The Cominercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements
Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 412, 413 (1948). "Requirements contracts on the
retail lever' (exclusive dealing contracts) are designed to secure retail outlets for the
seller's products which would not offer competing products to the ultimate consumers.
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U. S. 457
(1941) (agreement among manufacturers of women's garments not to sell to retailers who
also sold garments copied from designs of any of the manufacturers belonging to the
Guild was held illegal); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 2S8 U. S. 346
(1922) (plaintiff manufacturer was not permitted to enforce an agreement to sell patterns
to a retailer who had agreed not to sell others' patterns). Exclusive supply contracts
to "sole agents" are not within the scope of Section 3 of the Clayton Act bccause of the
agency relationship; the Clayton Act is applicable to agreements with Independent buyers
only. Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923).
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fendant occupied a dominant position in its particular market, for substantial
lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly can be readily inferred from such
dominance.0 In International Salt Co. v. United States,7 which involved the tying
of the sale of an unpatented article with the lease of a patented article, the Court
rejected the need of showing an actual or probable lessening of competition, or the
comparative position of the defendant with the defendant's competitors, When the
defendant controlled a substantial portion of the market.8
But, the Court has used as the standard of legality the economic consequences of
various agreements to show that the agreements have not lessened competition when
the defendant was not in a dominant position in the market.0 This comparative
5. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U. S.
457 (1941) (controlled 40% of market); International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936) (controlled 81% of market); United Shoe Machinery
Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922) (controlled 95% of market); Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922) (controlled 60% of market).
6. Although there are benefits to the buyer which would induce him to use a re-
quirements contract, this may not be the only reason for his accepting a requirements
contract for "the buyer may be compelled practically to take term requirements contract
by reason of a dominant supplier's refusal to deal on any other basis or because the
volume discounts offered are so substantial as to make purchases on any other basis im-
practical. The threat of boycott or direct competition should not be lost sight of as
coercive practices." Further, if the supplier is attempting to foreclose competitors, he
"must normally possess substantial competitive advantages, in order to be able to with-
stand retaliatory measures from its competitors." Stockhausen, The Commercial and
Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. 'REv. 412, 414
(1948).
7. 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
8. The Court in the International Salt Co. case stated that the volume of business
affected by International Salt Co.'s agreements was not "insubstantial". Id. at 396. But,
actually International Salt Co. was the largest producer of salt for industrial use. Thus,
substantiality in International Salt Co. v. United States means dominant position; com-
pare, in the instant case, Standard's 6.7% sales which is also "substantial".
9. In Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935),
aff'd per curiam, 299 U. S. 3 (1936), the court held that restrictive covenants to -use only
authorized parts on defendant manufacturer's cars were valid because they protected
good will. "Furthermore, the record shows that competition in the sale of replacement
parts for automobiles instead of growing less has substantially increased through the
period during which the provisions complained of have been in force and, while It may
be that competition would have increased more rapidly in the absence of such provisions,
the trial court rightfully concluded that such was not the 'substantial lessening of com-
petition' which the Clayton Act was designed to prevent." Id. at 644. In Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923), the Court in passing on the
legality of defendant's agreements with retailers under Section 3 of the Clayton Act
considered the possible effects of the agreements and the reasons for their use. It should
be noted that defendant's contracts did not prohibit a dealer from selling competitors'
products; merely prevented the dealer from storing gasoline other than defendant's In
defendant's storage tanks and pumps, even though most of the dealers would have only
one pump. B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 292 Fed. 720 (7th Cir. 1923)
was brought under Section 3. The court stated: '". . . it was only five years previous
that petitioner entered into this doubtless then well standardized business, in competition
RECENT DECISIONS
standard, the "rule of reason",10 was originally applied as a means of determining
whether certain practices were illegal under the Sherman Act by considering the
advantages of the economic utility of the practice as against the disadvantages
arising from the curtailment of competition.11 The finest statement of the "rule of
reason" was made in Cldcago Board of Trade v. United States'2 in which the
Court ruled upon a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, saying: "The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its con-
dition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts."' 3 In International Shoc Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission 4 it was held that the "rule of reason" applied to the Clayton Act as well
as to the Sherman Act.15 The Courts have never condemned all exclusive supply
with many others, most of whom have arrangements with their jobbers more or less
similar, and that in the face of this competition, in such brief time built up a business
of about 4,000,000 pounds for its last year. From this it may well appear that the
similar practice by others in the same class did not result in stifling of competition and
monopolizing the trade to the substantial or serious detriment of this recent entrant
therein.' Id. at 722.
10. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948), the Court in dis-
cussing the standard of legality of a restraint under the Sherman Act said: ". .. we do
not think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look rather to the
percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether the
action springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable de-
velopment of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market."
Id. at 527. The "rule of reason" was first stated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1 (1911) when the Court stated that the Sherman Act did not include every
restraint but only those which were unreasonable. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U. S. 344, 360 (1933).
11. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923), the
Court in referring to the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act said:
"The great purpose of both statutes was to advance the public interest by securing fair
opportunity for the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest
desire for gain." Id at 476. The court in Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 282 Fed. 81
(3rd Cir. 1922), aff'd, 261 U. S. 463 (1923) stated that the only test of legality known is that
used by "the courts in construing the Sherman Act with reference to acts 'which operate
to the prejudice of the public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly ob-
structing the due course of trade,' . . " Id. at 87.
12. 246 U. S. 231 (1918).
13. Id. at 238.
14. 280 U. S. 291 (1930).
15. In International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U. S. 291, 298 (1930)
which was brought under Section 7 of the Clayton Act (which uses the same phrase, "sub-
stantially lessen competition", as in Section 3), the Court expressly approved the state-
ment made by the court in Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 282 Fed. 81, 87
(3rd Cir. 1922), af'd, 261 U. S. 463 (1923): "Therefore in determining vhether given
acts . . . substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly within the
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contracts as being illegal per se.' 0
Requirements contracts prevent the buyer from buying the goods of the seller's
competitors since they bind the buyer to buy all of his needs of a particular
article, or articles, from the seller. Thus, if the effect of the requirements contracts
in question "may be to substantially lessen competition," the contracts would violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The question presented to the Court was what
standard of proof is to be used to determine whether such contracts "substantially
lessen competition." The majority of the Court held that a comparative standard (the
"rule of reason") would defeat the purpose of the Clayton Act for it would re-
quire the Court in each case to consider the mass of evidence which would be
necessary to show an actual or probable lessening of competition. 17 The majority
opinion stated: "It seems hardly likely that, having with one hand set up an
express prohibition against a practice thought to be beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act, Congress meant, with the other hand, to reestablish the necessity of meeting
the same tests of detriment to the public interest as that Act had been interpreted
as requiring."' 8  They reasoned that if such evidence were received, the courts
would be unprepared to evaluate it properly.19 The Court, admitting that Standard's
proportion of the market had not increased, drew the inference that "it is possible
that its position would have deteriorated but for the adoption of that system"
(exclusive dealing contracts).20 The Court affirmed this quantitative standard as
the only practical standard of proof. Thus, the Court reasoned, where the agree-
ments involve a substantial portion of commerce, such agreements foreclose com-
petitors from a substantial portion of the market. It automatically follows from the
foreclosure of a substantial portion of the market that competition is substantially
lessened. The Court stated that requirements contracts were not the only means
available to the industry in order to supply retail stations. It suggested that the
defendant could return to agency agreements, add company owned service stations,
or have independent dealers order specified quantities; these methods would be
limited by the anti-monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act. 2 '
In the dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson, with whom the Chief Justice and
Justice Burton joined, Justice Jackson disagreed with the assumption of the trial court,
which the majority sustained, that lessening of competition follows automatically from
meaning of the Clayton Act, the only standard of legality with which we are acquainted
is the standard established by the Sherman Act. ... "
16. In the decision of the District Court from which the defendant in the instant
case appealed, the trial court rejected the government's contention that requirements
contracts were illegal per se, 78 F. Supp. 850, 857 (S. D. Cal. 1948). See United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948); Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd, 299 U. S. 3 (1936).
17. 337 U. S. 293, 312, 313 (1949).
18. Ibid. See note 11 supra.
19. The courts have received such evidence in considering restraints of trade under
the Sherman Act and also under the Clayton Act. Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918). See notes 10 and 15 supra.
20. 337 U. S. 293, 309 (1949). It should be noted that the Court draws an Inference
as to what may have been the result except for such agreements, but refuses to give the
defendant the opportunity to refute such an inference; see note 23 infra and accompany-
ing text. Compare in note 9 supra the courts' statements in Pick Manufacturing Co. v.
General Motors Corp. and B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n.
21. 337 U. S. 293, 310 (1949).
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foreclosure of a substantial portion of the market.22 Justice Jackson continued: "More
over, the trial court not only made the assumption but he did not allow the de-
fendant affirmatively to show that such effects do not flow from this arrangement.
Such evidence on the subject as was admitted was not considered in reaching the de-
cision that these contracts are illegal."23 The minority agreed that the courts are not
well suited for receiving such evidence but since they have the duty to decide such
issues "the only possible way for the courts to arrive at a fair determination is
to hear all relevant evidence from both parties and weigh not only its inherent
probabilities of verity but also compare the experience, disinterestedness and credi-
bility of opposing witnesses."2 4 Justice Jackson based his dissent on the ground that
requirements contracts are not illegal per so although "that is the substance of
what the Court seems to hold."2z Requirements contracts do not lessen competition
within the meaning of the Clayton Act merely because the retailer will not buy
from competitors during their terms, for many contracts, considered outside the
scope of the Act, have this effect. The minority was of the opinion that the real field
of competition in the gasoline industry is in the sales to the ultimate consumers;
the retail service stations merely being a means to reach these consumers. The
requirements contracts are well adapted to the needs of the retailers in a line where
consumer demands fluctuate by permitting him to be adequately supplied at all
times with goods of known quality.
Justice Douglas in a separate opinion criticized the majority opinion on the ground
that it does not curb the large industries because they are large, but will merely
effect a lessening of the number of independent dealers and an increase in the number
of company owned or controlled service stations.2 0
The Court has in effect held the "rule of reason" inapplicable to Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, despite the fact that the Court, previously, has held that the "rule
of reason" is applicable to other sections of the Clayton Act which use the same
phrase, "may be to substantially lessen competition." The Court in the instant
case did not even mention Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission= in which
the "rule of reason" was first adopted as the standard of legality for the Clayton
Act; nor did it mention International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Cornmissiomi- in
which the Court expressly approved the decision in the Standard Oil case of 1922
(above). Although the majority opinion admitted that all of the cases considered
show that there must be some showing of the economic consequences of the agree-
ments,29 it rejected this view in favor of the rule which is properly applied only
where the supplier is able to use his dominant position to force the purchasers to
22. Id. at 321 (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson). In note 1 of the dissenting
opinion, Justice, Jackson asserted that International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U. S. 392 (1947) should not be considered in connection with the instant case for that
case involved "tying" contracts in connection with a patent monopoly.
23. 337 U. S. 293, 322 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 323 (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson).
26. Apparently the statement in the majority opinion which especially aroused Justice
Douglas to express his views is the one that Standard Oil Co. might absorb independently
operated gas service stations. 337 U. S. 293, 310 (1949).
27. 282 Fed. 81 (3rd Cir. 1922), aff'd, 261 U. S. 463 (1923).
28. 280 U. S. 291 (1930).
29. 337 U. S. 293, 302 (1949).
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deal with him exclusively or to tie in sales of other goods.3 0 It is evident that
lessening of competition can be readily inferred from dominant position combined
with "tying" contracts or involuntary acceptance of exclusive dealing contracts
by retailers, for foreclosure of competitors is the only reason for their use,31 but
such an inference cannot be drawn without supporting evidence when the defendant
does not occupy a dominant position and the exclusive supply contract is for
the primary benefit of the purchaser. The Court in the instant case ignores its
own previous declarations that the purpose of the Act is to curtail practices det-
rimental to the public interest, which would require an inquiry as to whether the
practice was actually or probably detrimental to the public interest.32 Thus, it
appears that, in the future, determinations under Section 3 of the Clayton Act will
not involve consideration of whether competition actually or probably will be
diminished.
The Court has left future decisions as to legality under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act to be "but a guess in the dark."33 If a substantial amount of money, outlets,
or units of products are involved, then there is substantial lessening of competition.
But, what is a substantial amount? What is substantial in one industry may not be a
substantial amount in another industry.3 4 Thus, the future decisions of the courts
as to substantiality are to be purely arbitrary.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion reached the more logical conclusion;
substantiality in number of outlets and amount of products sold is insufficient to
decide the legality of sales contracts without proof that the actual or probable effect
may be to substantially lessen competition. Unless such proof is required, the Court
in effect will be changing the statute from ". . . where the effect of such . . . sale,
or contract for sale . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce," to when the agreements affect a
substantial portion of the market.
The Court has endangered the reasonable and necessary use of requirements
contracts by businesses which use this purchasing system because they are unable
to estimate what their needs will be in the future. Prescinding from the question
of the correctness of the decision in the instant case 'if all relevant evidence were
considered, the decision has apparently condemned all requirements contracts when
they affect a substantial portion of commerce. But, it is evident from the legislative
history of the Clayton Act that Section 3 was designed to prohibit "tying" con-
tracts and exclusive dealing contracts when the retailer was forced to accept such
30. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
31. 337 U. S. 293, 305 (1949).
32. See note 15 supra.
3:". 337 U. S. 293, 322 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson).
34. In the instant case the Court held that 6.7% of the total sales was a substantial
amount under the Clayton Act. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of American, 148 F. 2d
416 (2d Cir. 1934), the court said that control of ninety per cent of the market would
constitute a monopoly under the Sherman Act but "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-
four per cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Id. at 424.
In International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U. S. 291 (1930), the Court
stated that there was no competition for 95% of the business between the defendant
and a company which the defendant had purchased "and if it be conceded that the
entire remaining five per cent of each company's product . . . was sold in competitive
markets, it is hard to see in this, competition of such substance as to fall within the
serious purposes of the Clayton Act." Id. at 298.
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a contract because of dominant position of the supplier.as There is no question
that these prohibitions are justified and necessary in the above instances, but there
is no justification for extending the literal meaning of the Act beyond the spirit
of the Act which would work a hardship on those it is supposed to protect. It is
possible that the courts will make this distinction when the question of the legality
of "requirements contracts on the manufacturing level" is presented to the courts.mG
TUSThS--IVOCABrLITY-EMAINDER OR REVERSIO.-Settlors each created a trust,
in both of which the trustees were directed to pay the income to the settlor during
her life and upon her death to convey the principal of the trust to the persons whom
the settlor should appoint in her will, or, in default of appointment, to the settlors
next of kin as in intestacy. In addition one instrument provided that the settlor should
join in the execution of any conveyance or mortgage of any of the property or of a
lease for a period of more than three years or of the appointment of a successor
trustee. The other instrument provided that in the management of the trust property
the approval of the settlor's father was required during his lifeime. Under the first
instrument the children of the settlor asked for a distribution of the trust res to them
as remaindermen. In the other instance, the settlor, claiming a reversion by virtue
of which she would be the only person beneficially interested in the trust, attempted
to revoke the trust under Section 23 of the New York Personal Property Law. The
Appellate Division affirmed an order directing the trustees in the first case to distribute
the corpus of the trust among the children of the settlor and in the second case
determined that the settlor could not, by notice of revocation executed by her alone,
revoke the trust. On appeal, l/d, one judge dissenting, affirmed on the ground that
the future estates limited in both instruments created remainders in the next of kin
of each settlor as a result of the intention of the settlors as expressed in both
instruments. In re Burchelis Estate; Worm v. United States Trust Co., 299 N. Y.
351, 87 N.E. 2d 293 (1949).
The question as to whether an estate, limited to the heirs of the grantor, creates
a remainder in the heirs or a reversion in the grantor has long presented a problem
seemingly without solution. The problem originated under the feudal system as a
result of the invention of the "doctrine of worthier title", i.e., whenever a grant or
devise gave to the heir the same estate as he would otherwise have taken by descent,
he took by the latter.1 Under this doctrine the title to an estate limited to the heirs
35. The primary purpose of Section 3 was to make "tying" contracts illegal, but ex-
clusive dealer contracts which were forced on the buyer were also to be prohibited by
the section. 51 CONG. RFc. 15819. But there was no attempt to invalidate the Urequire-
ments contract on the manufacturing level." Air. Carlin, a member of the House
Judiciary Committee, in reply to a question asked during a committee hearing expressly
denied that the section was intended to reach agreements between a manufacturer and a
consumer to supply all of the consumer's needs of a particular article. Mr. Carlin con-
tinued: "It simply says a man shall not require you to make an exclusive contract to
sell his goods only." Hearings before Committee on the Judidary on Trust Legisltion,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 967 (1914).
36. This question is now before the court in California. United States v. American Can
Co., Civil No. 26345-H (N. D. Cal. 1949).
1. 2 Br. Coar. *241 (1800); REsTArTEa T, PROPRTv § 314 (1940). See Note, The
Rule Favoring Title By Descent Over Title By Devise, 46 HAry. L. REv. 993 (1933).
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of the grantor reverted by fiction of law to the grantor and through him by descent
to the heir on termination of the intermediate estate. This doctrine was developed
in response to the reluctance of feudal lords to relinquish certain incidents of feudal
tenure, which incidents were lost when title passed by descent. 2 Although the original
purpose for which the "doctrine of worthier title" was created has long since dis-
appeared,3 the doctrine survives today as a source of constant annoyance to bench
and bar.
One of the more frequent applications of the doctrine in modern practice occurs
in trust cases where it is imperative to decide the question "remainder or reversion"
as a prerequisite to determining whether or not the settlor of the trust has the right
to revoke the trust. As provided in both Section 118 of the New York Real Property
Law and Section 23 of the New York Personal Property Law, a trust may be revoked
by the settlor upon the written consent of all those beneficially interested in the
trust. It is frequently essential under this statute, therefore, to determine whether a
remainder or reversion has been created in order to determine who is beneficially
interested in the trust.4
At early common law the doctrine, as applicable to real property, operated as a
rule to create a reversion in the settlor, regardless of what he may have intended.0
This was the law in New York6 until the celebrated case of Doctor v. Hughes.7 In
that case the settlor created a trust of real property and gave the trustee power to
mortgage or sell the premises during the life of the settlor. Upon the death of the
settlor the trustee was to convey the premises, if not already sold, to the heirs of
the settlor, and if the premises had been sold, then the trustee was to pay the proceeds
of the sale to the heirs. The trustee was empowered within his sole discretion to
reconvey the property to the settlor. After stating that the rule [of worthier title]
".. . was never applied in all its rigor to executory trusts . . . which were 'moulded
by the court as best to answer the intent of the person creating them'"s the court
held that the intention of the settlor was not so clearly expressed as to warrant a
finding that a remainder was created. The court went on to state: "But at least the
ancient rule survives to this extent, that to transform into a remainder what would
ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation must be clearly
expressed." 9 Doctor v. Hughes thereby modified the doctrine of worthier title. The
intention to create a remainder would now be sufficient to overcome what had pre-
viously been a rule of law requiring all limitations of estates to the heirs of the grantor
to be construed as reversions. But the rule of worthier title (i.e., reversion to the
settlor) was to be overcome only when the intention on the part of the grantor to
create a remainder in his heirs was "clearly expressed". The doctrine thus became
.. a rule of construction, if not . . . of property."'
1
This doctrine of worthier title, as we have noted, survived the death of the feudal
system as a rule peculiar to estates in real property presumably since it had its origin
in the feudal law of real property." In personal property trusts, on the other hand,
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 23; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 118.
S. See note 1 supra.
6. Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43 (N. Y. 1850).
7. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
8. Id. at 311, 122 N.E. at 222.
9. Id. at 312, 122 N. E. at 222 (italics supplied).
10. Id. at 311, 122 N.E. at 222.
11. See note 1 supra.
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no such rule or doctrine was applied. Since early common law the intention of the
settlor in such cases had always been the test in determining whether the limitation
ever resulted in a reversion or a remainder.' 2 While the introduction of the test of
intention into the construction (remainder or reversion) of real property trusts by
Doctor v. Hughes might be expected to lead later courts to lessen the distinction
between real and personal property trusts insofar as construing estates of expectancy
was concerned, that decision had in fact a most unusual result. Relying upon it the
Appellate Division in Berlanbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.,' 3 applied the modified
doctrine of worthier title in a trust case involving only personal property. The court
cited Doctor -v. Hughes as controlling and stated that "a grant to one's next of kin
creates a reversion in the grantor and gives nothing to the next of kin by way of
remainder unless there be unambiguous and unequivocal language indicating a contrary
intent."' 4
This subjection of the personal property trusts to the modified doctrine of worthier
title was completed by the Court of Appeals in Engel v. Guaranty Trust C05 There,
for the first time, the Court of Appeals discussed the doctrine in connection with a
personal property trust and cited one of its earlier decisions, Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co.,' 6 as authority for the proposition that "transfers of personal property are
embraced by the ancient rule. . . . "17 Examination of the opinion in the Whittemorc
case, however, reveals that nowhere in the opinion is it suggested that the doctrine
of worthier title should apply to personalty as well as realty.28
In the Engel case the court further modified the doctrine of worthier title by
stating that the rule "is with us no more than a prinma fade precept of construction
which may serve to point the intent of the author, when the interpretation of a
writing like this trust agreement is not otherwise plain. . . It must give place to a
suffickit expression. by a grantor of his purpose to make a gift of a remainder to
12. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929); Franklin
v. Chatham Phenix Trust Co., 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N.Y. Supp. 115 (Ist Dep't 1932);
Stella v. New York Trust Co., 224 App. Div. 50, 229 N.Y. Supp. 166 (Ist Dep't 1928);
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 609, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1058, 1060
(1st Dep't 1914), where the court stated that "the plaintiff did not intend by this deed of
trust to give those who will be her next of kin at the time of her death a present beneficial
interest in the property." Nothing was said about the "doctrine of worthier title ' nor was
it suggested that a presumption of reversion existed; the court merely gave effect to the
intention of the settlor. See also Cram v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N.Y. Supp. 486
(1st Dep't 1916); National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 129 N.Y. Supp. 846
(1st Dep't 1911); Hoskin v. Long Island Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 25S, 123 N.Y. Supp.
994 (2d D6p't 1910).
13. 235 App. Div. 170, 256 N.Y. Supp. 563 (Ist Dep't 1932).
14. Id. at 172, 256 N.Y. Supp. at 566.
15. 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E.2d 673 (1939).
16. 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929).
17. Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra at 47, 19 N.E. 2d at 675.
18. In the Whittemore case it is stated that "where it fairly appears that intention would
be promoted by that construction, words which create a remainder in the next of kin of
the life beneficiary should also create a remainder in the next of kin of the settlor. . . . "
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., supra at 302, 165 N. E. at 456. The court in the
Engel case apparently relied on the foregoing language for its assumption that the doctrine
embraced personal property, yet in the above quotation the court is merely reiterating the
common law test of intention theretofore applied in personal property cases.
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those who will be his distributees."'19 This would seem quite a different rule of con-
struction than was laid down in Doctor v. Hughes. Now, the strong presumption of
reversion which heretofore could be abated only by "clearly expressed" intention to
create a remainder, was transformed into a mere precept of construction to be uti-
lized by the court to tilt the scales in favor of a reversion only when the weight of
evidence pointing to remainder on the one side substantially balanced the weight of
evidence pointing to a reversion on the other.20
Had the Engel decision been uniformly applied, it would have long since resulted
in the complete emasculation of the worthier title doctrine. While the New York
courts, however, have consistently followed the Engel decision on the point that
trusts involving personal property are embraced by the doctrine,21 the Court of
Appeals in the later case of Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank,22 reannounced the test
of Doctor v. Hughes that, "at least" the intention be "clearly expressed" to effect a
transformation. Nevertheless the concurrent existence of the two rules, i.e., that of
Doctor v. Hughes and that of the Engel case, caused such confusion in the later cases
that an Appellate Division Justice was recently forced to admit that he could not
understand the basis on which reversions had been found in some cases and remainders
in others.23
Nor was this obfuscation lessened any by the highest court in New York when the
problem was presented to them once again. Quite the contrary; for in Richardson
v. Richardson,24 the Court of Appeals spanned the intervening years to accept again
the criteria set forth in the Engel decision. In the Richardson case the settlor created
a trust in personal property whereby she was to have the income and profits for her
life, with a reserved power to appoint in her will the takers of the trust principal
on her death. Should she fail to exercise the power of appointment, the principal was
to go to her mother upon the settlor's death. Should the mother predecease her, the
principal was to go to her next of kin as in intestacy. In determining that the settlor
created a remainder, the court accepted the rule of the Engel case, i.e., that the
doctrine be utilized only to point up the intention of the author when the intention
of the settlor is ambiguous. The court reviewed the criteria employed in those cases
since Doctor v. Hughes where the New York courts had found a remainder although
the settlor reserved the power of appointment by will. It appeared that in each of
those cases the courts emphasized first, that the settlor had made complete disposition
of his property without providing for it to revert to him on any contingency; second,
that the settlor did not reserve any power to grant or assign the property, and third,
that the only control over the property reserved by the settlor was that of testamentary
disposition.25
19. Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra at 47, 19 N. E. 2d at 675 (italics supplied).
20. See note 23 infra.
21. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 294 N.Y. 666, 60 N.E. 2d 757 (1945).
22. 295 N.Y. 488, 492, 68 N.E. 2d 503, 505 (1946), where it was stated that "the
direction to transfer the trust estate to the settlor's next of kin is-as in Doctor v. Hughes
-'... equivalent to reservation of a reversion' and the intention to transform that reversion
into a remainder must be clearly expressed." But see Minc v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 263 App.
Div. 141, 31 N.Y. S. 2d 592 (1st Dep't 1941); Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 261 App.
Div. 465, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1941) which adhered to the rule of the Engel case.
23. See opinion of Calahan, J., in Juller v. Central Hanover Bank, 272 App. Div. 598,
74 N.Y.S. 2d 262 (1st Dep't 1947).
24. 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E. 2d 54 (1948).
25. Id. at 142, 81 N.E. 2d at 58.
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RECENT DECISIONS
In each of the principal cases income was reserved to the settlor for life. Upon
each settlor's death the principal was to go to such persons as she should appoint by
will, or in default of appointment, to her next of kin as in intestacy. In neither case
was there an alternative remainder to named persons such as appeared in the Richard-
son case. Yet the court seems to have relied upon the latter case as demanding the
finding of a remainder. While recognizing that the doctrine of worthier title is not
dead, the court states that the presumptions as a rule of construction have lost much
of their force since Doctor v. Hughes, that evidence of intent to create a remainder
need not be overwhelming, and that the rule is now one "which allows the language
of the instrument creating a remainder to take effect providing some additional evi-
dence pointing the intent of the grantor is present to buttress the language which
would create the remainder." 20
Although the court states broadly that "sufficient additional indications" of the
settlor's intent to create a remainder exist, the only factor specifically mentioned is
the reservation of the power of appointment. While the reservation of a power of
testamentary disposition has received considerable attention in previous cases, its
significance has been related to the thought that the settlor has divested himself of
all power over the corpus except that of appointment by will. So in the Richardson
case the court states as one of the four reasons for its finding of a remainder the fact
that the settlor "surrendered all control over the trust property except the power to
make testamentary disposition .... "28 In no case has the existence of such a power
of appointment been considered affirmative evidence of intention to create a remainder
or by itself determinative of such intention.
However, in the Richardson opinion the court remarked in passing that had the
settlor intended to create a reversion the retention of a power of appointment would
have been superfluous.29 And while the court in that case, in its summary of the
evidence of intent to create a remainder, makes no further reference to this idea, but
as noted above, looks to the reservation of the power as indicating a lack of sufficient
control, the court in the instant case has apparently lifted the concept of superfluity
out of its context in the Richardson case and has made it the determining factor for
its finding of an intent to create a remainder. Although it notes that among the
(otherwise not specified) indications of the settlor's intent was the reservation of the
power of appointment by will as the sole control over the corpus, it goes on to state
that the reservation of the testamentary power is evidence that the settlor believed
she had created a remainder and reserved the power to defeat such a remainder
interest.30
26. 299 N. Y. 351, 361, 87 N. E. 2d 293, 296 (1949) (italics supplied).
27. Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra at 46, 19 N.E. 2d at 675, where it was stated
that "the chief reason for that view [that a remainder was created] was the circumstance
that the only provision which the settlors made for control by them of the trust principal
gave them no power save that of testamentary disposition thereof." (italics supplied). See
also Livingston v. Ward, 247 N.Y. 97, 105, 159 N.E. 875, 876 (1928), where the court
stated that the direction to the trustees to convey the fee back to the grantor "does not
show any intent by the grantor to divest himself of any part of his estate or to transfer
it to his heirs." See also Conroy v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 271 App. Div. 200, 62
N.Y.S.2d 926 (1st Dep't 1946), where the trust principal was to go to the heirs "unles
otherwise disposed of", the court held that that provision was evidence of the settlor's
intention to create a reversion.
28. 298 N.Y. 135, 144, 81 N.E. 2d 54, 59 (1948).
29. Id. at 143, 81 N.E. 2d at 59.
30. In the Richardson case at 143, 81 N. E. 2d at 58, it is stated that "she [the
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As Judge Fuld points out in his dissenting opinion the instruments creating the
trusts were clearly such that had no reservation of power of testamentary appointment
been made, a reversion would clearly have been indicated. There was in neither case
more than the reservation of a life estate with a limitation over to the settlor's next
of kin as in intestacy-a classical example of the type of grant on which the doctrine
of worthier title operated. To hold that an expression in the instrument of a right
which the settlor would as a matter of law have under the operation of the doctrine
is sufficient evidence to overcome the doctrine, is at least unrealistic, whether the
criteria of the weight of evidence be that of Doctor v. Hughes or the Engel case.
Certainly the Richardson decision does not compel the finding in the principal case,
unless we are going to say that every limitation "to A for life, remainder to my heirs"
has inherent therein those factors which, in conjunction with the reservation of power
of appointment, spell out a remainder, viz., a full and formal disposition of the corpus,
with no reservation of power to grant an interest during the lifetime of the settlor,
no provision for the return of the corpus to the settlor, and the surrender of all other
control. While such a position could conceivably be taken, this is clearly not the
meaning of the rules laid down by the Richardson decision since such an interpretation
is inconsistent with the very existence of the doctrine of worthier title, either in its
original or modified form, and would prevent any limitation from being controlled
by the doctrine.
settlor] provided for a testamentary power of appointment only, and, since we have pre-
sented to us the question of her intention, if we are to follow the reasoning in the Whitle-
more and Engel cases ...we must assume that she believed she had created a remainder
... and had reserved the power of appointment to defeat" the remainder. Yet, while
failing to mention that in the Richardson case the court emphasized that the only power
reserved was testamentary in pointing out that the settlor could have intended a remainder
in spite of that fact, the court in the principal case transformed the above quoted language
into a rule making the reservation of testamentary power actual affirmative evidence of
intention to create a remainder.
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